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Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account
Youngjae Lee*
Are repeat offenders more culpable than first-time offenders? In the United
States, the most important determinant of punishment for a crime, other than the
seriousness of the crime itself, is the offender's criminal history. Despite the
popularity of the view that repeat offenders deserve to be treated more harshly
than first-time offenders, there is no satisfactory retributivist account of the
"recidivist premium. " This Article advances a retributivist defense of the
recidivist premium and proposes that the recidivist premium be thought of as
punishment not, as sometimes suggested, for a defiant attitude or a bad charac-
ter trait, but as punishment for an omission. The culpable omission that justifies
the recidivist premium is, this Article argues, the repeat offender's failure, after
his conviction, to arrange his life in a way that ensures a life free of further
criminality. This Article argues that, although how individuals conduct their
lives as a general matter is not properly the business of the state, once offenders
are convicted of a crime, they enter into a thick relationship with the state and
that this relationship gives rise to an obligation for the offenders to rearrange
their lives in order to steer clear of criminal wrongdoing. This theory,
"recidivism as omission, " offers a firm theoretical foundation to justify the
recidivist premium because it does not rely on unwarranted inferences from re-
peat offenders' criminal histories that they are "bad people" or that they are
"defiant of authority." Rather, this account focuses on the significance of con-
viction and punishment themselves and the ways in which they alter an
offender's relationship to the state. In addition, this Article argues that obliga-
tions between the state and offenders run in both directions and that we should
recognize the ways in which the state may be a responsible actor that should
share the blame for recidivists' reoffending.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Andrew
Ashworth, Chris Bennett, Mitch Berman, Antony Duff, Ian Farrell, Kim Ferzan, Dick Frase, Whir
Gray, Abner Greene, Doug Husak, Ken Levy, Sandra Marshall, Stephen Morse, Alice Ristroph,
Julian Roberts, Paul Robinson, Julie Suk, Michael Tonry, Andrew von Hirsch, Ian Weinstein, Peter
Westen, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments and conversations about earlier drafts. This
Article has also benefited from discussions at the Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop, the
Colloquium on the Role of Previous Convictions in Criminal Sentencing at the Institute of
Criminology of the University of Cambridge, and the Evolution of Criminal Law Theory
Conference at the Rutgers University Institute of Law and Philosophy. I would also like to thank
Dan Markel for serving as the commentator on this Article at the Rutgers Conference.
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Recidivism as Omission
I. Introduction
Are repeat offenders more culpable than first-time offenders?' In the
United States, the most important determinant of punishment for a crime,
other than the seriousness of the crime itself, is the offender's criminal
history.2 There may be many reasons for this practice. Some argue that
repeat offenders have demonstrated a propensity not to be deterred by ordi-
nary sanctions and must be threatened with especially harsh consequences to
prevent them from reoffending. 3 Others argue that the point of harsh punish-
ments on repeat offenders is to keep those most likely to reoffend away from
the public so that they can no longer pose a danger to others.4 Criminal his-
tory may also be considered relevant in the way an offender's general
1. This Article uses the terms "repeat offender," "recidivist," "offender with prior record," and
"offender with criminal history" interchangeably and as a way of describing only those who
reoffend after being convicted for previous offenses. While this is the most common understanding
of the terms, it is not the only way to define them. For example, if a person commits multiple
crimes but is sentenced separately for them, that person may be sentenced as a "repeat offender" in
every sentencing that follows the first one. That is, if an offender is sentenced in the morning for a
crime and then sentenced in the afternoon for the second crime, it is possible for the second
sentence to be enhanced on the basis that the offender accumulated a "criminal record" that
morning. This Article is not about those with "criminal records" in this latter sense, although
arguments discussed in this Article have implications for such cases as well. See Markus Dirk
Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 706 (1995); Ronald F.
Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW & POL'Y 429,
443 (1998) (both making a similar distinction). For more on the meanings of "prior" and "history"
in the terms "prior record" and "criminal history," see, for example, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 71 (1996);
cf Nils Jareborg, Why Bulk Discounts in Multiple Offence Sentencing?, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
SENTENCING THEORY 129, 129 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1988) (distinguishing
between "recidivists" and "multiple offenders").
2. See Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME &
JUST. 303, 341-51 (1997) (demonstrating the significant role of criminal history in determining
sentence lengths in several jurisdictions); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 1,
at 67 ("[AII guideline systems include considerations of criminal history .... ); Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Guidelines Are "Alive and Well" in the United States, in SENTENCING REFORM IN
OVERCROWDED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 12, 16 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen
Hatlestad eds., 1997) ("All guidelines states base their recommended sentences primarily on the
conviction offense and the offender's prior conviction record."). For general discussions of
recidivist statutes, see, for example, 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habitual Criminals §§ 1-55 (2008);
ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 7.5 (3d ed. 2004); JOHN CLARK ET AL., NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE
LEGISLATION 1-4 (1997); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(b) (2d ed.
1999). Sentencing enhancements for criminal records have a long history. See, e.g., CLARK ET AL.,
supra, at 9-12; Alexis M. Durham, Justice in Sentencing: The Role of Prior Record of Criminal
Involvement, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 614, 616-18 (1987); Michael G. Turner et al., "Three
Strikes and You're Out "Legislation: A National Assessment, 59 FED. PROBATION 16, 17 (1995).
3. E.g., Dan Lungren, Three Cheers for Three Strikes, POL'Y REV., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 34, 37.
But see David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110
YALE L.J. 733, 737 (2001) ("Because previous violators face higher probabilities of detection,
conventional economic theory dictates lower penalties for previous offenders than for those with
clean records.").
4. E.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., Instant Replay: Three Strikes Was the Right Call, AM. PROSPECT,
Summer 1994, at 12, 12.
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personal background and character are considered relevant during the
sentencing stage. If rehabilitation is considered to be an important purpose
of punishment, then it seems to follow that sentencing should take into ac-
count whatever information may aid the legal system in deciding what type
and what amount of punishment are appropriate to reform individual
offenders. 5  These three rationales-deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation-are prima facie plausible as justifications for the practice of
considering criminal history in sentencing, at least in theory.6
However, once we ask whether repeat offenders deserve more
condemnation than first-time offenders for the same offense, the picture turns
fuzzy. It is commonly, and casually, assumed that repeat offenders deserve
more punishment than first-time offenders. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, for instance, justify their heavy reliance on criminal history
partly on the argument that "[a] defendant with a record of prior criminal be-
havior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater
punishment."7 The political rhetoric surrounding California's three-strikes
law 8 frequently included the language of desert and retribution, with some
people saying that repeat offenders deserve draconian prison sentences for
being recidivists. 9 Public perceptions of a crime's seriousness appear to vary
according to the criminal record of the offender as well.' °
By contrast, desert theorists have been generally critical of sentencing
enhancements based on the offender's criminal history I and they have
5. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-50 (1949); see also JULIAN V. ROBERTS,
PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 35-
36 (2008) (noting that a consideration of the recidivism of offenders is crucial to measuring the
effectiveness of sentencing rules aimed at rehabilitation).
6. In practice, there are many unanswered empirical questions about how to arrive at an optimal
level of prevention that does not amount to a waste of resources. For some discussions of relevant
empirical questions, see ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 30-35; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRNG ET AL.,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 85-105 (2001);
and James Austin et al., The Impact of 'Three Strikes and You're Out,' 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y
131,155-58(1999).
7. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A, introductory
cmt. (2008) (emphasis added); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 67 ("One
reason to consider prior record in sentencing is to ensure awareness of an offender's increased
culpability.").
8. CAL PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b)-(i) (West Supp. 2006).
9. See, e.g., Stephanie Simon, Three Strikes Advocates Passionately Defend Law, L.A. TIMES,
July 3, 1996, at A16 (quoting a murder victim's mother as saying, "When TV gives us this 2%-
minute sound bite about the poor soul who stole a piece of pizza, they ask if he deserves to spend 25
years to life in prison. Well, the truth of the matter is, he probably does").
10. ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 172-74; Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Criminal Record,
and the Sentencing Process, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 488, 491 (1996).
11. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 462-66 (1978); RICHARD SINGER, JUST
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 67-74 (1979); see also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 1, at 67 ("Those who espouse a just desert or retributive
philosophy argue that prior record should play a very limited role or no role in sentencing."); Aaron
J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the US. Sentencing
[Vol. 87:571
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criticized recidivist statutes such as California's three-strikes law on
retributivist grounds.12 A common objection is based on the principle that
punishment should be proportional to crime. The seriousness of a crime does
not change, the argument goes, depending on the criminal history of the per-
son committing it. A robbery is a robbery, whether it is committed by a first-
time offender or a repeat offender; therefore, there should be no difference
between the way the state responds to repeat offenders and first-time offend-
ers who commit the same crime.1 3 Another common objection starts from
the view that one should not be punished twice for the same offense. If of-
fenders have already been punished for their crimes, they have paid their
debts to society, and this means that increasing the amount of punishment for
second crimes on the basis of their criminal histories results in double
jeopardy.' 4
Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 595 (2003) ("Just desert theorists have far greater difficulty in
explaining why criminal history is a relevant sentencing factor [than utilitarian theorists].").
12. I count myself among such critics. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against
Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REv. 677, 735-36 (2005) (arguing that California's three-strikes
law produces penalties that violate the retributivist constraint); see also ZIMRING ET AL., supra
note 6, at 121, 120-21 (noting that the penalties under the California three-strikes law are
"nonproportional or indeed antiproportional"); Dubber, supra note 1, at 705, 705-07 ("Repeat
offender laws ... penalize an offender's insufficient obsequiousness and.., they have nothing to
do with the offender's present moral desert as they punish her not for the present act, but for another
act already punished."); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429, 1435-37 (2001) (arguing that much of the
time spent in prison by repeat offenders, after an initial period of earned retribution, is "a purely
preventive detention that cannot be justified as deserved punishment"); Michael Vitiello, Three
Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 425-32 (1997)
(noting that under many habitual-offender statutes "long sentences are imposed without regard to
the culpability of the offender or degree of social harm caused by the offender's behavior").
13. See SINGER, supra note 11, at 68, 67-74 ("[T]he harm imposed by the offense is the same in
each instance; the injury inflicted both on the individual victim and, perhaps less clearly, on society
appears to be the same."); see also Mirko Bagaric, Double Punishment and Punishing Character:
The Unfairness of Prior Convictions, 19 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 10, 18, 17-18 (2000) ("[A] consistent
retributivist is committed to ignoring prior convictions in determining penalty since they have no
bearing on the seriousness of the instant offense."); Dubber, supra note 1, at 705 ("A person who
robs another of $20 at gun point is no more blameworthy simply because she had five years earlier
been convicted of burglary."); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive
Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 146-47 (1996) ("When an offender has served the sentence for a
crime, the 'slate is wiped clean.' The next offense of a previous offender is no worse per se, the
victim is no more harmed, than if the offense were the offender's first."); Roberts, supra note 2, at
317 ("Popular conceptions of desert theories would appear to rule out the use of criminal history
information, as the focus is on the offense of conviction, and not previous criminal conduct.").
14. Bagaric, supra note 13, at 13; Rappaport, supra note 11, at 595; James D. Stuart,
Retributive Justice and Prior Offenses, 18 PHIL. F., Fall 1986 at 40, 43 ("On a just deserts or
retributive theory, it would seem that it is wrong to punish an offender more severely for a second
offense if that person has already paid for the first offense, since that amounts to punishing the
person twice for the first offense."). One scholar put it this way:
If a judge is punishing the offender for other offenses upon which he has already been
sentenced, such legislation would violate double jeopardy. An offender sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, in the language of retributivists, must pay his debt to society.
His debt is measured by the term of imprisonment. Completion of the term of
imprisonment pays that debt. When the offender commits another offense and the
2009]
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Therefore, while the belief that repeat offenders are deserving of greater
punishment is widespread, there is no satisfactory retributivist defense of that
prevailing view, 15 prompting one leading scholar on the topic to note that "a
plausible retributive justification for the recidivist sentencing premium has
proved as elusive as the legendary resident of Loch Ness."' 16 And as another
scholar noted, it appears that on this issue "[t]he difference between elite and
popular conceptions of desert is stark."' 7
earlier conviction becomes a prior strike to increase his term of imprisonment, that
increase cannot be additional punishment for the earlier crime. To punish the offender
again for the same conduct would violate double jeopardy.
Vitiello, supra note 12, at 426 (footnote omitted). The double-jeopardy argument and the
proportionality argument can be thought of as the same argument about proportionality in two
different forms if we take the view that the prohibition of double jeopardy is a way of enforcing the
proportionality limitation. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR CRIMINAL LAW 309, 309-10 (1993) (arguing that prohibitions
of multiple punishments for repeat offenders are "motivated by a proportionality worry"); see also
Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 104 (1995) ("[Tihe contours of constitutional limits on the
amount of punishment that can be inflicted for a particular wrong, traditionally a part of the Eighth
Amendment and due process law, are inseparable from the constitutional limitations on the
frequency with which an offender can be punished for that wrong, typically rooted in double
jeopardy doctrine.").
15. Andrew von Hirsch is frequently mentioned as a desert theorist who supports sentencing
enhancements based on offenders' criminal histories. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 11, at 596
(noting that von Hirsch advocates the use of a defendant's prior criminal record in assessing
culpability); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1315 n.74 (2006) (identifying von Hirsch as a proponent of the theory that
"repetitive criminal behavior makes an offender deserve more punishment"). While it is true that he
held such a view at one point, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS 84-88 (1976) (arguing that a first offender is deserving of less punishment than a
person who has committed multiple offenses), his faith in the idea did not last very long, and he has
since declared his argument about repeat offenders in Doing Justice to be "mistaken." Andrew von
Hirsch, Criminal Record Rides Again, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1991, at 2, 2 [hereinafter
von Hirsch, Criminal Record]. He has instead defended the idea of mitigation for first-time
offenders-as opposed to aggravation for repeat offenders-for the past few decades. ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 81-91 (1986); von Hirsch, Criminal Record, supra, at 2;
Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591, 592
(1981) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions]. This view, which is also known
as "progressive loss of mitigation," has been influential among some desert theorists. Martin Wasik
& Andrew von Hirsch, Section 29 Revised: Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 1994 CRIM. L. REV.
409, 410; see also ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 188 (4th ed. 2005)
(describing "progressive loss of mitigation" as "characteristically adopted by desert theorists");
Martin Wasik, Guidance, Guidelines, and Criminal Record, in SENTENCING REFORM: GUIDANCE
OR GUIDELINES? 105, 122 (Martin Wasik & Ken Pease eds., 1987) ("The theory of progressive
mitigation, which is akin to just deserts, appears to be gaining prominence in English
writings .... ). However, its focus on mitigation, not aggravation, puts it at odds with the common
sentiment about repeat offenders' enhanced culpability. This view is examined in more detail
below. See infra section II(B)(1).
16. Julian V. Roberts, Punishing Persistence: Explaining the Enduring Appeal of the Recidivist
Sentencing Premium, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 468, 469 (2008); see also Richard S. Frase, State
Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1190, 1212 (2005) (noting that "[plunishment theory is quite underdeveloped" as to this issue).
17. Ristroph, supra note 15, at 1318. The purported difference between "elite" and "popular"
conceptions of desert raises the following question: What should be the significance of ordinary
[Vol. 87:571
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The lack of a retributivist account of the recidivist premium is
problematic because an articulation of a retributivist basis could serve both as
an affirmative basis for increasing a repeat offender's punishment and as a
negative constraint that limits permissible amounts of punishment. Without a
good retributivist-based account of the recidivist premium, it would be diffi-
cult to raise justice or fairness arguments against habitual-offender statutes
that impose dramatic increases in sentences on repeat offenders on the basis
of incapacitation and deterrence rationales.
This Article supplies such an account, and it defends the views that
repeat offenders are more culpable and that sentencing enhancements for
prior convictions are justifiable on retributivist grounds. In order to avoid the
common retributivist objections mentioned above, we may approach the
question in two different ways. First, we may shift the focus away from the
gravity of each criminal act and onto the person who connects the past and
current transactions. That is, the idea is not to make the punishment fit the
crime but to have the punishment fit the person. Second, we may give an
account of how it is the case that an offender's past criminal history makes a
current offense somehow worse than an equivalent crime committed by a
first-time offender.
Part II focuses on the former approach; Part III focuses on the latter.
Parts II and III argue that the common objections against such arguments-
that a liberal state should punish for acts and not for character and that a lib-
eral state should not punish for defiance or disobedience-are wrongheaded.
Parts II and III also argue, however, that neither the validity of the idea that
character is relevant in culpability determinations nor the validity of the idea
of punishing for disobedience can justify the recidivist premium. In other
words, the problem with these arguments is not that they are committed to
the notion of punishing for character or punishing for disobedience per se,
but that they cannot explain the recidivist premium.
Part IV advances a new theory of the recidivist premium. Part IV
argues that we should think of the recidivist premium as stemming not from
our enhanced understandings of repeat offenders' bad characters or allegedly
defiant attitudes, but from what the repeat offenders have failed to do be-
tween the time of the previous conviction and the time of the new offense. I
call this justification for the recidivist premium "recidivism as omission."
intuitions about desert when one is theorizing about desert? If a popular belief about a question of
desert does not match up with conclusions arrived at through theorizing and reflecting about desert,
who should revise their views-the people or the theorists? Some may argue that when there is a
gap, the people's views control because the question of what offenders deserve should ultimately be
decided by "the people," as opposed to answered through some objective derivation from
philosophical principles. Others may argue that the question of what people deserve is a matter of
objective moral reality, and that the popular opinions should play no role in such determinations. In
my view, neither argument is correct. I explore this question in more detail in Youngjae Lee,
Desert and the Eighth Amendment, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract - 1234263.
20091
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Part IV argues that punishments for such omissions are permitted because the
relationship between an offender and the state is altered when the first con-
viction and punishment occur. The offender then has an obligation to
organize his life in a way that reduces the risk of his reoffending, and it is the
failure to fulfill that obligation that justifies the additional punishment. Part
IV also explains why, under this account, habitual-offender statutes such as
California's three-strikes law go too far. Part IV further points out that the
relationship between the offender and the state is a two-way street, in the
sense that offenders' obligations to organize their lives in a way that steers
clear of criminality coexist with the state's corollary obligation not to inter-
fere with their return to normal lives.
This Article concludes with two caveats. First, there is one other
fairness argument that this Article does not discuss-namely, the idea that
people who collect impressive criminal records over time "forfeit" their
standings as citizens and the freedoms that come with such standings. I raise
some preliminary doubts about the validity of this forfeiture argument.
Second, because this Article focuses on the question of desert, it does not
address the question of whether the state is ever justified in "punishing"
those who are likely to reoffend beyond the level allowed by the just-deserts
constraint for reasons having to do with incapacitation or deterrence. The
point of this Article is to articulate a retributivist justification for the
recidivist premium, and this Article does not attempt to answer the thorny
question of whether punishment of repeat offenders beyond what they de-
serve should ever be permitted for preventive reasons.1 8
II. Punishing Bad Character
A. Character and Culpability
The practice of punishing repeat offenders more than first-time
offenders is often criticized on the basis that it punishes people for their
characters as opposed to for their conduct. 19 Conversely, it is sometimes
18. There is an extensive literature on the question of "selective incapacitation" of dangerous
offenders, which is separate from the issue of what repeat offenders deserve. For some general
discussions, see, for example, ASHWORTH, supra note 15, at 206-17; ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 48-53 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH,
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 50-61 (2005); Morse, supra note 13;
Anthony E. Bottoms & Roger Brownsword, Dangerousness and Rights, in DANGEROUSNESS:
PROBLEMS OF ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION 10 (John W. Hinton ed., 1983); R.A. Duff,
Dangerousness and Citizenship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 141 (Andrew
Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998); Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders
and Preventive Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383 (2008); Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 36-42 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Bagaric, supra note 13, at 15 ("[U]nder a system of punishment governed by law
there is no basis for ascribing weight to character. People should be punished only for what they
do; not according to the type of people we think they are."); Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad
Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal
Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1033 (2004) (arguing that habitual-offender statutes like
[Vol. 87:571
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argued that a theory of criminal culpability that makes references to
offenders' bad character traits is unacceptable precisely because it leads to
unjust laws like three-strikes laws.20 Such criticisms accurately capture the
political rhetoric surrounding the three-strikes-laws debate-that these are
"bad people" who are being singled out for special treatment-and thus are
prima facie plausible as objections. For instance, one prosecutor commented
that a three-strikes law punishes offenders for "being recidivists," and not
only for their latest offense. 2' However, the slogan that criminal law should
punish for what people do and not for who they are is misleading. In a sense,
it is accurate to state that we punish people for who they are and not just
what they do, but not necessarily in a way that renders legitimate the com-
mon political rhetoric in favor of three-strikes laws.
In what sense do we punish offenders for who they are as well as for
what they do? At the most basic level, we should first recognize the essential
role of an actor as a recipient of blame and punishment.22 According to Joel
Feinberg's formulation, desert statements have the form "A deserves X in
virtue of Y," where A is the person deserving, X is what that person deserves,
and Y is the desert basis, or whatever serves as the basis for X. 23 Even though
it is commonly stated that our criminal justice system judges acts, not people,
we cannot make any sense of the practice of blaming if we try to think about
it exclusively in terms of wrong acts, detached from actors. Blaming actors
for what they have done implies that the acts that they have engaged in
"reflect badly" on them, and to blame them for what they have done thus
requires that we see a tight relationship between the actors and the acts.24
California's three-strikes law imagine criminals to have bad characters and create a "class system
based on permanent moral inferiority" making "the criminal a permanent lesser citizen").
20. Yankah, supra note 19, at 1029.
21. Wendy Thomas Russell, Those Who Struck Out: Most Third-Strikes Are Non-violent, Local
Sentencings Show, but Most of Those Sentenced Had Violence in Their Past, LONG BEACH PRESS,
Oct. 31, 2000, at A6 ("You're not sending them away for petty theft with a prior. You're sending
them away for their felony history." (quoting Long Beach Deputy District Attorney Christopher
Frisco)); see also Andy Furillo, Most Offenders Have Long Criminal Histories, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Mar. 31, 1996, at Al ("Any discussion of 'three strikes' has to include discussion of the person's
priors. These people are being punished for being recidivists, not just the current offense." (quoting
Santa Clara County District Attorney Kathy Storton)).
22. GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 7 (2006); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, Nietzsche's
Minimalist Moral Psychology, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 65, 72 (1995) ("Blame needs an occasion-an action-and a target-the person who did
the action and who goes on from the action to meet the blame.").
23. JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970).
24. SHER, supra note 22, at 7 (stating that blame has the structure of a reaction "to a person on
the basis of the wrongness of what he has done," as opposed to a reaction "to the wrongness of what
a person has done"); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 (2005) ("In holding an agent
responsible for an action, we imply that the action reflects on the agent in some way."); John
Gardner, On the General Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW:
PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 205, 236, 236-37 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) ("The criminal law gets
personal. To be convicted of a crime is to be criticized, or even sometimes condemned, as a
person.").
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This proposition-that blaming a person for an act entails a judgment
that the act reflects badly on that person-implies that a criminal justice sys-
tem may punish people only for "actions that are in a real sense their own.
25
Only when actions are "their own" can we justify blaming persons for what
they do.26 Theories of culpability that bridge the gap between an actor and
an act through the notion of "character" derive some of their persuasive force
from this idea of one's ownership of one's acts. According to this account,
character plays both inculpatory and exculpatory roles in criminal
culpability. It is appropriate to blame persons for their acts if the bad acts
can be traced to their character defects.2 7 It is inappropriate to blame persons
for their acts if the circumstances surrounding their actions are such that the
acts cannot be explained as resulting from their character defects.28
For instance, the duress defense requires, under the Model Penal Code
formulation, that the kind of threat that has brought about the crime be
25. NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES
71 (1988). She puts things slightly differently at times when she says, for instance, that "actions for
which we hold a person fully responsible are those in which her usual character is centrally
expressed," id. at 66, or that "it is unfair to hold people responsible for actions which are out of
character." Id. at 68. I am not as comfortable with these formulations as I am with the vaguer, and
hence more noncommittal, notion of one's "own" actions, because the terms "usual" and "out of
character" invite some theoretical troubles. See, e.g., JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 120
(2007) (noting the potential for character theory to generate a case for excusing defendants in some
intuitively implausible cases, such as when a defendant of otherwise honest or good character
succumbs to great temptation); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW &
PHIL. 345, 374-78 (1993) (suggesting different ways one might interpret the idea of an act's being
"out of character" for the relevant actor and demonstrating various problems that idea encounters);
Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193,
207 (1993) [hereinafter Horder, Criminal Culpability] ("[I]t might be taken to imply that even the
most grave harm, intentionally inflicted, is not to be regarded as culpable if it was uncharacteristic
of the agent to be moved to cause harm in this way. This would be a bad descriptive and normative
error."); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 29, 51-54 (1990)
(arguing that those who freely choose to do wrong are culpable no matter how "out of character" the
wrongful act may have been for the actor); Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25 LAW
& PHIL. 289, 333, 332-33 (2006) ("[T]he fact that wrongful conduct is an exceptional lapse of
otherwise good character provides no basis in law for exculpating an actor altogether."). For an
argument that a character theory need not be committed to the view that a person is not responsible
for "out of character" actions, see TADROS, supra note 24, at 49-53.
26. Duff, supra note 25, at 378, 369-78 ("[T]he element of truth in the 'character' theory [is]
that the action for which a person is convicted and punished must be 'hers,' in that they must be
appropriately related to attitudes or motives that are necessarily aspects of her continuing identity as
a person.").
27. ROBERT NOZiCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 382-84 (1981); Michael D. Bayles,
Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5, 7 (1982); Richard B. Brandt,
Blameworthiness and Obligation, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 3, 9-13 (A.I. Melden ed.,
1958); see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 264 (2005) (1730-40) ("Actions
are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in
the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them, they infix not themselves upon
him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil.").
28. TADROS, supra note 24, at 53 (explaining that, according to the character theory of criminal
responsibility, "[a] defendant is responsible for her action only insofar as that action is reflective of
the character of the agent").
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something "a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist., 29 According to this standard, even if a person genuinely
felt that he has no choice other than to commit a crime to prevent a serious
harm to himself by someone else, the duress defense would not be available
to him if he did not live up to the standard of behavior set by the hypothetical
"person of reasonable firmness." Persons of reasonable firmness are those
who recognize the wrongness of the crime they are being pressured to com-
mit and are courageous enough to resist the pressure.3° If someone who
commits a crime meets the requirement of the duress defense, the message
the legal system communicates is that the crime does not reflect badly on the
offender because the source of the criminality is something external to the
offender's self, and giving in to the threat of harm is not to be condemned
because the offender has behaved in the same way a reasonable person would
have.31
Conversely, if the duress defense is not applicable in a particular
offender's situation, the legal system judges the offender for being the sort of
person who either does not live up to society's expected standard of fortitude
and resistance to criminal temptations or threats, or does not care sufficiently
about the seriousness of the values that the law protects, or both.32  Of
course, this is not to say that the law is punishing the offender for being a
coward; rather, the punishment is for the crime itself. Implicit in the
punishment, however, is the proposition that whatever pressure the offender
might have felt to commit the crime is something that should have been
resisted, and the failure to resist it shows a blameworthy character defect.
There are many questions here, and an extensive literature on the
relevance of character to criminal culpability has grown around the debate
among the "choice," "character," and "capacity" theories of culpability.3 3 To
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
30. Duff, supra note 25, at 358 (suggesting that the "reasonable person" be understood as
"someone with a reasonable or proper regard for the law and the values it protects, and having a
reasonable or proper degree of courage").
31. Duff, supra note 25, at 359 ("To say.., that a 'reasonable person' would have given in is to
say that (even) someone with a proper regard for the law and its values, and with a proper degree of
courage, would have given in: in which case this person's giving in did not display a lack or failing
for which she can properly be condemned."). For a more detailed and nuanced discussion of
different situations in which the duress defense is available, see R.A. Duff, Rule- Violations and
Wrongdoing, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 47, 63-68 (Stephen
Schute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002).
32. Duff, supra note 25, at 358-59. It is also possible that what the reasonable-person test does
in a particular context is serve as an evidentiary device-for example, to determine whether the
report of fear of one's life is credible or is a mere exculpating story developed after the commission
of the crime in order to avoid conviction. R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We
Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 175 (2002) [hereinafter Duff,
Virtue].
33. For examples of literature covering these issues, see generally FLETCHER, supra note 11, at
799-802; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
152 (1968); HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME, supra note 25, at 99-133; LACEY, supra note 25, at 58-78;
NozICK, supra note 27, at 382-84; TADROS, supra note 24, at 21-130; Peter Arenella, Character,
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give a full account of the current state of that debate in this Article would be
out of place. Further, my purpose here is not to declare that the character
theory of culpability is superior to competing accounts, nor is it to solve all
the problems that the character theory of culpability raises. It does, however,
seem to me that character theorists are correct when they argue that criminal
law punishes persons for their actions only when those actions reflect badly
on the actors in the sense that the actions display their character defects.
Without an account along these lines, it is difficult to explain what makes up
the relationship between actors and their acts, and why it is that we have no
trouble connecting our condemnation of a bad act to the agent who per-
formed it. In short, this is the sense in which it is correct to say that criminal
law punishes people for what they do and for who they are.
But we must be careful. As Antony Duff has pointed out, there is a
difference between treating character as a "condition of liability" and as an
"object of liability., 34 The formulation that we punish people for actions
only when they reflect their character defects can mean one of two things.
First, it may be argued that it is unfair to hold persons responsible for actions
not flowing from their character defects. Alternatively, it may be argued that
the legal system is ultimately more interested in character defects as objects
of condemnation, and that actions that express bad character are significant
only to the extent that they provide a window into persons' characters. The
account of the role of character in criminal culpability I have given thus far
does not appear to go beyond the former formulation, in which case it would
be misleading to state that we punish people for being who they are as op-
posed to for what they do. It would be more accurate to say instead that we
punish people for what they do, but only to the extent that what they do re-
flects who they are. Does this threaten my conclusion that we do punish
people for who they are and not just for what they do?
Not exactly. And that is because it is doubtful that we can neatly
separate out the two roles-condition of liability versus object of liability-
played by character in culpability determination. Once character defects are
thought to be behind the bad actions condemned by the criminal justice
system, and it is this link that satisfies the condition of liability, then it is
difficult to imagine how the character defects can escape the reach of
Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 59 (1990); Bayles, supra note 27, at 7; Duff, supra note 25; Duff, Virtue, supra
note 32; Claire Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317
(2002); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575 (1998); Horder, Criminal
Culpability, supra note 25, at 195; Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff,
18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 465 (2004); Moore, supra note 25; Samuel H.
Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and
Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719 (1992); Edmund L. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral
Character, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 905 (1973); Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and
Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99 (1996);
Westen, supra note 25; see also SHER, supra note 22, at 17-70.
34. Duff, Virtue, supra note 32, at 155.
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condemnation. The reasons we take character defects seriously as conditions
of liability do not suddenly cease to operate when it comes to objects of li-
ability as if there is some on-off switch. When a malicious act is condemned
when it reflects a malicious character, a cruel act is condemned when it re-
flects a cruel character, or a reckless and indifferent omission is condemned
when it reflects a callous character indifferent to suffering, there is no way
for the criminal justice system to avoid commenting on the actor's bad char-
acter trait as well as the bad act.
What does this account of the role of character in criminal culpability
imply for the debate on recidivism? It depends. If character is a condition of
liability, as opposed to an object of liability, then we can draw very little
from this discussion. Character is relevant to the question of whether some-
one can be held criminally liable, but the question of whether repeat
offenders are more serious criminals than first-time offenders is a different
matter. That is, the argument that crime and character must be connected for
there to be criminal liability leaves untouched the question of the legitimacy
of the recidivist premium.
But as just discussed, if character is a condition of liability, it is difficult
to avoid the implication that it can also be an object of liability. Perhaps we
could say that a repeat offender's criminal history warrants a more severe
state response to his current offense than would be directed at a first-time
offender, simply because the repeat offender's current offense and criminal
history together reveal something about him that is more blameworthy. In
other words, a repeat offender displays a vice that is distinctive to repeat
offenders. What is that vice?
It would be premature to answer this question in this Part. And that is
because the distinction I have started this discussion with-the distinction
between punishing the act and punishing the character-collapses under the
conception of the role of character in criminal culpability outlined here.35
Character is relevant to the extent that it is manifested in action, and action is
blameworthy to the extent it reflects a bad character. What this means is that
the focus of blameworthiness analysis remains on acts, not character, and this
in turn means that there is no difference between punishing the act and pun-
ishing the character, as far as our culpability evaluation is concerned. The
question at hand must thus be deferred to Part IV, in which I will discuss the
argument that offenses committed by repeat offenders are worse than those
committed by first-time offenders.
35. It does not collapse completely. See Duff, Virtue, supra note 32, at 157-58 (explaining that
punishing action to the extent that it shows bad character and punishing character to the extent that
it is manifested in action may appear to be merely two different ways of stating the same idea, but
that there is a difference between the two). But that makes little difference for the topic of this
Article.
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B. Recidivism and "Bad People"
1. First Time Offenses as Acts "Out of Character. "--Even if my
discussion in the previous section is correct, and the character theory of
culpability can collapse into a theory that focuses on the badness of acts, that
does not end the character theory of the recidivist premium, as it appears that
those who argue that recidivists are being punished not for their latest of-
fenses but for "being recidivists" have in mind something other than drawing
a firm link between actions and character traits in order to judge actions as
reflecting on actors.
There may be several alternative "character" theories of the recidivist
premium. To see the alternatives, it is helpful to first recognize a puzzle in
the idea that recidivists are being punished for being recidivists. If a person
is convicted of robbery once, is punished for it, and then commits another
robbery, what inferences can we draw about this person that warrant a
harsher punishment? To isolate the effects of criminal history, let us assume
that the first robbery and the second robbery are identical in every relevant
way except for the existence of criminal record in the second instance. It
seems odd to say that the person (O) at the time of the repeat offense (t2) is a
worse person than 01 at the time of the first offense (tl). The problem with
someone who repeats seems precisely to be that the person has not changed
despite the first conviction and punishment, not that the person has changed
for the worse. In other words, the person who has committed a crime at tl
and the person who has committed a crime at t2 is the same person, with the
same set of character defects, and that is the problem. So the idea of impos-
ing the recidivist premium on the person for being a recidivist should be
formulated in a way that is not limited to the idea of 01 being a worse person
at t2 than at ti.
One possibility is the idea of lapse or acts that are "out of character."
The reason 01 at t2 should be dealt with more harshly than O at t, is that, at
ti, it is possible that 01 acted in a way that was out of character, whereas any
inference that O's act was out of character at t2 would no longer be
warranted. This account, which is a theory of "first-offense discount," as
opposed to "recidivist premium," is a combination of two ideas: mercy and
epistemic limitations of the criminal justice system.
In a series of articles, Andrew von Hirsch has defended a version of the
first-offense discount. 36 Von Hirsch points out that even well-intentioned,
law-abiding citizens may at times come across opportunities to commit
36. E.g., von Hirsch, Criminal Record, supra note 15, at 2; see also VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 15, at 79; von Hirsch, Desert and Previous Convictions, supra note 15,
at 592; Andrew von Hirsch, Record-Enhanced Sentencing in England and Wales, 4 PUNISHMENT &
Soc'Y 443, 445 (2002) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Record-Enhanced Sentencing].
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crimes and may give in to the temptation at moments of weakness.37 The
first-time discount is given in acknowledgement of that fact and in the spirit
of tolerance and recognition of human frailty.38 This is the "mercy" aspect of
the first-offense discount. The discount is then gradually taken away as
one's criminal record grows, since a record of repeat offending starts to be-
come inconsistent with the idea that the given individual's criminal activity
should be characterized as a "lapse. 39 In other words, as a person accumu-
lates a history of offenses, any claim that the person's acts are somehow "out
of character" becomes no longer credible. This is the epistemic-limitation
aspect of the first-time discount. The idea is that the criminal justice system
is not able to tell whether first-time offenders have acted "out of character,"
in the sense of having a one-time slip, or whether they actually have
permanent, bad character traits that are manifested in their offenses. Since
the criminal justice system is not good at distinguishing those who lapsed
and those who are fundamentally criminals, it should err on the side of giving
a first-time discount and then take away the discount when someone with a
criminal history commits a crime, because at that point we know that the of-
fender is a criminal, not a law-abiding citizen who "slipped" in a moment of
weakness.
The first-offense-discount idea, however, has some problems as a
defense of the recidivist premium. First, the idea of "human frailty" is more
suited to the ideas of forgiveness and mercy than to the idea of desert. To the
extent that the first-offense discount is a theory of mercy as opposed to
desert, it dissolves the problem of the argument for the recidivist premium on
the basis of desert by denying the problem's existence. This account ex-
plains and justifies some differential treatment between first-time offenders
and offenders with criminal records, but it cannot explain the intuition that
the difference is due to the fact that repeat offenders are somehow deserving
of more punishment-an intuition that is indicated by people's increased
sense of resentment at recidivists.
Second, some people who are convicted for the first time did not have a
lapse that led to their first crime; rather, they simply did not get caught the
first time. The lapse theory does not apply to those whose first crimes did
not end in conviction. A criminal history is not a history of how many
crimes one has committed, but a history of how many times one has been
convicted, and the lapse theory has trouble explaining why convictions,
rather than multiple offenses, are significant. This is a specific manifestation
of a broader problem. If one's criminal record serves only the evidentiary
37. See von Hirsch, Criminal Record, supra note 15, at 55 ("The idea is that even an ordinarily
well-behaved person can have his or her moral inhibitions fail in a moment of weakness or
willfulness. Such a momentary loss of self-control is the kind of human frailty for which some
understanding ought to be shown.").
38. Id.
39. Id. ("The repeated offense can less and less plausibly be described as a lapse; it is no longer
a case of momentary failure of moral inhibition.").
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function of revealing one's true character, then the significance of conviction
and punishment becomes merely incidental. In other words, if there were a
better way of getting at the question of offenders' characters, then we would
not need to pay attention to criminal records at all. And there is no reason to
think that a conviction record is a better measure of character traits than, say,
family background, education, work history, and relationship to community.
2. Second Time Offenses as Marks of "Bad Character. "-The first
problem of the first-offense-discount argument can be solved only at the
exacerbation of the second problem. And this can be seen once we go back
to the initial formulation of the problem. I mentioned above that there is
something strange about the idea that O at t2 is a worse person than 01 at t1.
This is because the problem appears to be that 01 has not changed, not that
he has become worse. One solution to the puzzle is the idea that the reason
01 at t2 is worse than 01 at t, is not because 01 has become worse, but instead
is because the legal system now has a better understanding of 01 as a person
than it did at ti. Another way of putting this is as follows. Say at t, there are
two offenders, 01 and 02, who commit identical crimes. And after they are
convicted and punished, 02 never commits another crime, whereas 01 does,
at t2. Why should 01 be punished more harshly at t2 than he was at t1? The
answer is that 01 was in fact a worse person than 02 at ti-something that we
did not know at t1, but we do know now. The relevant comparison is, then,
between 01 and 02. We know that 01 has continued to offend, whereas 02
has stopped, which can give rise to the inference that 01 is worse than 02,
which in turn justifies the recidivist premium.
So, this theory would take into account the intuition that repeat
offenders are deserving of more punishment, as opposed to merely the idea
that first-time offenders are deserving of less punishment, by explaining the
recidivist premium as reflecting the state's increased knowledge over time of
an offender as a criminal. In other words, the epistemic-limitation aspect of
the first-offense-discount argument can be used to generate an argument in
favor of the recidivist premium, as opposed to an argument in favor of the
first-offense discount. This revision, however, worsens the second problem
because what we infer from offenders' criminal records is not merely the
conclusion that their offenses are not acts out of character, but also that they
in fact have character traits that are worthy of the extra punishment.
And what would those character traits be? It would depend on their
offenses, but some possibilities may be as follows: cruelty, malice,
abusiveness, arrogance (manifesting in the belief that rules of the society do
not apply to them), callousness, dishonesty (if the crimes involve fraud),
greed, hatred (if the crimes are motivated by hateful feelings), indifference
(to human suffering), lack of discipline (if the crimes result from an inability
to stick to a law-abiding path), weakness of will (if the crimes result from an
inability to resist temptations), insensitivity, irresponsibility, or ruthlessness.
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Now, these kinds of character traits may be relevant at the guilt stage,
depending on how a crime is defined. For instance, a person who is found to
be guilty of murder for driving drunk and killing may be found by the jury to
have manifested some of these character traits. If so, what does one's crimi-
nal record add in terms of character assessment once a person has been
convicted of a crime? We might conclude that a repeat conviction demon-
strates that such bad character traits are deeply ingrained. The conclusion is
warranted by the fact that the first conviction and punishment apparently
have not brought about a reform, when we may assume that those who have
not re-offended were able to change their ways. And unlike other character
approaches outlined thus far, it ties the enhanced culpability of repeat of-
fenders to the process of conviction and punishment by positing, as a key
step in the analysis, the assumption that those who do not respond to
punishment have character traits that are deeply ingrained.
An account like this may be the best and most plausible theoretical
approach to the recidivist premium that focuses on the character of the
offender. But first, a cautionary note is in order. To the extent that the idea
of evaluating those with deeply ingrained bad character traits as "worse
people" deserving of greater blame appeals to us, we must be careful to
separate its appeal from two related ideas-prediction of future offending
and forfeiture of one's citizenship-which have no place in determinations of
what people deserve.
How deeply ingrained a vice is in a person may be relevant to the issue
of incapacitation. If a character trait is thought of as a tendency for a person
to act in a certain way with a certain mindset in certain situations over time,
then how "deeply ingrained" a character trait is becomes a question that is
relevant to whether a given offender will go out and manifest that character
defect again. One's judgment that a repeat offender deserves more punish-
ment may in fact be driven by a fear of future offenses, and we must be
vigilant not to slip into that potential confusion.
Also, there is a tendency in political rhetoric to conflate the idea that
repeat offenders deserve more punishment because they are "bad people"
with the very different idea that those who offend repeatedly have forfeited
their positions in society. 4° Whether criminals "forfeit" some basic rights as
a result of their offending is a problematic idea,41 and the forfeiture concept
works with a different logic from the logic that drives the idea of just deserts.
Therefore, if the recidivist premium is to be defended on some sort of
40. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Verdict on '3 Strikes' Law Mixed After First 10 Years, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 8, 2004, at B1 ("Criminals with two strikes already have had a chance to go straight,
[sponsors] argue, and forfeit their right to live outside prison if they can't or won't obey society's
rules.").
41. See, e.g., Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 327, 332-34 (1985) (offering some criticisms of the idea that state punishment is justified by
offenders' forfeiture of their rights to liberty).
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forfeiture-theory grounds, it should be examined separately from the just-
deserts analysis.
Now, there are some problems with the character theory of the recidivist
premium, which focuses on the ideas that a repeat conviction demonstrates
that bad character traits are deeply ingrained and that people with such
deeply ingrained bad character traits deserve more punishment. First, notice
that the list of character traits mentioned above shows that these character
traits, even if all are considered vices, cannot all be considered criminal by
themselves. The character traits themselves do not come with clear labels
like "criminal" and "noncriminal." Perhaps a criminal, in committing a
crime, demonstrates some of these vices, and perhaps society's condemna-
tory response to the criminal is rightly limited only to situations where the
criminal acts can be connected to the bad character traits. But these character
traits cannot themselves be targets of criminal law. The traits can be ex-
pressed in both criminal and noncriminal ways, and focusing on the traits
themselves as opposed to the criminal acts occludes the extent to which how
these traits are expressed makes all the difference in the world for the legal
system. This problem, it seems to me, is a symptom of a broader problem
with theories of culpability that focus on character traits.42
Second, there remains the issue that the same conduct may reflect
different defects in character, and it is not clear whether we can infer which
character traits people have by looking at their behaviors. For instance, we
may have several people who steal once, get caught and punished, and then
after their punishments steal again. One thing that these thieves may have in
common is that they desire goods and they are willing to steal from other
people to satisfy such desires. But they may steal for different reasons. One
person may steal because he has no respect for other people's claims to their
property or the legal system that protects people's property rights. Another
may, on the contrary, recognize that others have valid, legally protected
claims to their things, but steal because she has trouble resisting the tempta-
tion of getting something for nothing. Yet another may steal because he is
jobless, and stealing is the simplest and quickest way for him to feed himself.
Yet another may steal in order not just to feed herself but to feed her
children. And so on. It seems prima facie sensible to take some of these
differences into account in sentencing; however, it is not then clear how in-
formative the idea of "repeating" offenses can be in assessing people's
character, compared to all other factors that may be relevant. There is no
clear reason to privilege one's criminal history as particularly informative of
an offender's character.
42. For related criticisms of the character theory of culpability, see, for example, Alan Brudner,
A Theory of Necessity, 7 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 339, 346 (1987). Brudner writes: "Inasmuch a wicked
character may be manifest in ways other than through the perpetration of criminal acts, [the
character theory of culpability] renders problematic the act requirement of criminal law." Id.; see
Horder, Criminal Culpability, supra note 25, at 206 ("In a liberal society there could be no reason to
prohibit the formation or display of bad character as such .... ").
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Third, the idea that certain character traits are deeply ingrained in
recidivists and that is what justifies the additional punishment has the
unattractive consequence of treating a large number of people as permanently
irremediable. It seems to me that here some critics of character theories of
culpability have a valid concern.43 This is not to assert that it makes no sense
to treat character traits as permanent. Perhaps it is foolish to think that if we
wait long enough, we will eventually see a good side in a person-given that
in the long run we are all dead. At the same time, asserting that certain peo-
ple have deeply ingrained bad character traits that they could never rid
themselves of could lead society to give up on them and feel justified in for-
ever excluding a certain set of people from the society. We should be wary
of a way of thinking that seems eager to draw a line between insiders and
outsiders and seeks to segregate "outsiders" from the rest of the society-
potentially permanently.
While these concerns do not "refute" the character theory of the
recidivist premium, they are serious weaknesses nevertheless. The next Part
examines efforts that focus on the increased badness of a repeat offense as
the justification for the recidivist premium.
III. Punishing Bad Acts
Another approach to the recidivist premium is to focus not on offender
characteristics, but on whether offenses committed by those with criminal
records are worse than offenses committed by those without. Here I consider
two arguments, one having to do with notice, the other with defiance. The
"notice" argument need not detain us long, whereas the defiance argument
merits a more extensive discussion.
A. Notice
The "notice" argument for the recidivist premium is that a person is
more aware of the wrongness of a criminal activity after being convicted and
punished for it. The same way that we draw a distinction in culpability be-
tween "knowingly" and "unknowingly" in standard mens rea analysis, one
might argue that a greater awareness that what one has done is wrong con-
tributes to a greater level of culpability the second time around, which in turn
justifies a greater amount of punishment.4 For instance, persons who are
unaware that blowing one's nose at the dinner table is considered rude by the
host may be forgiven the first time they do the offensive deed, but it would
not be as forgivable if they do it again after having been told that hosts
consider such behavior rude and unacceptable.
43. See, e.g., Yankah, supra note 19, at 1033.
44. Von Hirsch has made this argument in Doing Justice and later retracted it in Past or Future
Crimes. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 15, at 78-79.
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There are several problems with the notice argument. First, it seems to
imply that the recidivist premium must be limited to situations where a per-
son is committing the same crime for which that person has previously been
convicted and punished. The idea may be that a person committing a rob-
bery is potentially unaware that robbery is prohibited, but that the person
becomes aware of it after being convicted. But if that is the case, there
would be no reason to presume that his conviction for robbery would put him
on notice that rape is prohibited as well. In other words, under the notice
theory, persons with prior convictions for robbery should not receive sen-
tencing enhancements for their criminal records if they are later convicted for
rape. Perhaps it is fruitful to determine the relationship between an
offender's current offense and past offense when judging how large of an
increase on the basis of one's criminal record is appropriate, 45 but the con-
cept of "notice" is much too crude to do that kind of work.46
Second, the argument seems to depend on the patently implausible
assumption that most people who are convicted of crimes for the first time
are unaware, until the time of apprehension, of the illegality of whatever they
were doing that led to their conviction. If a person is convicted of shoplifting
and, after having been punished for it, does it again, it is unclear in what
sense the person is more aware of the wrongness of stealing the second time
unless one assumes that it is unreasonable to expect people to know that
stealing is a crime without first having been convicted for it. The absurdity
and unacceptability (both as a factual and a normative matter) of defenses
like "I didn't know rape was illegal," or "I didn't know stealing was illegal,"
is, at its core, what is right about the maxim that ignorance of the law is no
excuse.
47
One possible response to my objection is to apply the recidivist
premium only in situations where the traditional maxim, "ignorance of the
law is no excuse," is most problematic. For instance, if an American moves
to Paris, starts publishing writings doubting the existence of the Holocaust,
and is prosecuted, he may first argue, quite plausibly, that he, being an
American, did not realize that voicing his opinion about the existence of a
historical event was a crime.48 Even if this response would be credible the
45. For a general discussion, see Roberts, supra note 2, at 331-33.
46. One way of avoiding this problem may be to reformulate the notice theory so that, under the
theory, what one learns after the first conviction and punishment is not just that, say, stealing is
wrong, but also that it is wrong to disobey the law. The heightened awareness, then, would be about
the wrongness of disobeying the law, and one might say that repeat offenders are more culpable
than first-time offenders because of such heightened awareness. This revised version would avoid
the implication that those who rob the first time and rape the second time should not be subject to
the premium. This version, however, is vulnerable to other objections to the notice argument,
which I discuss below.
47. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6 (4th ed. 2000).
48. See Law No. 90-615 of July 13, 1990, Journal Officiel de la Ripublique Franqaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], July 14, 1990, p. 8333 (criminalizing racist, anti-Semitic, and
xenophobic acts).
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first time around as a mitigating factor, it should not be available as a
mitigator if he does the same thing again after having been convicted under
French Holocaust-denial laws. Of course, he may still argue that his freedom
of expression should not be curtailed, but that is a different argument from
the argument that he did not realize what he was doing was illegal.
One possibility, then, is to design the law in such a way that the answer
to the question of whether the recidivist premium applies tracks the strength
of the maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse for different laws.49 Some
of the factors that courts have used to determine whether ignorance of law
could be a defense are: whether the offense is malum in se or malum
prohibitum; whether the subject matter is likely or unlikely to be legally
regulated; whether the ignorance is ignorance of criminal law or ignorance of
noncriminal law; whether the defendant relied on an authoritative source of
law; and whether the charge is based on an act or omission. 50 So perhaps the
recidivist premium should exist for crimes that are not obviously criminal but
should not exist for crimes that are obviously criminal. But this would be
odd; the recidivist premium would then be available for malum prohibitum
(say, going over the speed limit because of a misunderstanding in what the
correct speed limit is) but not be available for malum in se (say, sexual
assault). There is no question that a criminal defendant's awareness of
wrongness of his conduct is relevant to his culpability-and exactly why this
is true is a question that I explore in further detail below when considering
the defiance argument for the recidivist premium. But it is strange to con-
clude that the more obviously wrong an offense is, the less culpable someone
is for repeating it.
51
A different, stronger response to my objection to the notice argument
for the recidivist premium would focus on the meaning of the term "notice."
It may be the case that everyone "knows" that stealing is wrong in the
abstract, but once a person is apprehended for stealing, convicted, and then
punished, then he really knows that stealing is wrong. That is, there may be a
difference in quality between knowledge based on direct experience and
49. See, e.g., Douglas Husak & Andrew von Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of Law, in
ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157, 166-71 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1996)
(distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable ignorance of law, and arguing that mitigation
and exculpation should be more available for the former); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules
and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 647, 646-47
(1984) (listing different factors courts use to decide whether to allow a mistake-of-law defense and
concluding that "the law is not reducible to any simple rule" and that it "consists of an entire array
of decisional variables that give rise to almost endless permutations").
50. Dan-Cohen, supra note 49, at 646.
5 1. This is not to say that it would be a bad idea to use the obvious-nonobvious distinction as a
way of sorting through when ignorance of law might be an excuse or a mitigating factor. It may in
fact be desirable to have the mistake-of-law defense reconfigured along such lines. See Husak &
von Hirsch, supra note 49, at 166-71 (distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable mistakes
of law). My point here is merely that it would be odd to have the recidivist premium apply
according to the logic of the obvious-nonobvious distinction.
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knowledge based on indirect experience. A repeat offender's knowledge-
the knowledge that the offense was wrong, caused real harm to real people,
and deserved society's condemnation-should be held not just in some in-
tellectual sense, but also in a deeper, experiential, affective sense. And, the
argument might go, it is that deeper, more personal, individualized sort of
knowledge-perhaps analogous to the phenomenon of "muscle memory"-
that is missing in the case of the first-time offender.
This suggestion is plausible, but it cannot carry the weight of justifying
the recidivist premium. First, there is no good reason to focus on criminal
record to get at this-or any other-kind of notice. Say a person grows up in
a household of criminals. He experiences firsthand what crimes look like
and what law enforcement looks like when crimes take place. Even if he
never commits the crimes himself, he may be close enough to the experience
that he ends up with the kind of advanced knowledge about the effects of
crimes that those who learn about crime only secondhand-from books, TV,
movies, and various other media outlets-lack. The implication of the notice
argument seems to be that persons with this kind of advanced knowledge
when they commit crimes are more culpable than persons who lack such
knowledge. And this seems odd.
Even if we set aside the oddness of this implication, it seems that a more
direct way of getting at the question of how familiar offenders are with the
wrongfulness and the harmfulness of their crimes would be to do a back-
ground check on all convicts to see how much they knew about how bad
crimes can be when they committed the crimes for which they are now being
sentenced. There would be little reason to give criminal records much
weight-thus drawing a sharp distinction between first-time offenders and
repeat offenders-because many first-time offenders know, in both the su-
perficial sense (from reading books, watching TV, etc.) and the deep sense
(from direct experience), what is wrong with what they are doing when they
commit crimes.
B. Punishing Disobedience
The other argument that is frequently mentioned as a justification for
punishing repeat offenders more is a bit more difficult to unpack
conceptually. The argument is that repeat offenders should be punished extra
for "defiance,,,52 "disobedience,, 53 "lack of respect for the law," 54
52. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 15, at 79.
53. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME 126 (2006) (finding "plausib[le] the view that what distinguishes the first-time and
habitual offenders' acts is the amount of disobedience involved").
54. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 168 (2001). Duff
provides:
Another possibility might be to argue that the repeat offender's current offense is more
serious and thus deserving of harsher punishment because, in addition to the wrong
intrinsic to the particular offense, he now displays a culpable lack of respect for the
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"insubordination," 55 "contempt of state authority, '56 or "'thumbing [their
noses]' at the justice system., 57 Commentators tend to reject this argument.
Antony Duff, for instance, has argued that "a liberal polity... should not
punish 'disrespect' as a wrong distinct from or additional to the particular
substantive crimes., 58 Andrew von Hirsch has objected that "[t]reating defi-
ance as an evil in itself that warrants substantial extra punishment
presupposes authoritarian assumptions about the state, the community and
the criminal law."59  George Fletcher similarly writes that "in a liberal
society, defiance should not constitute a wrong that justifiably enhances the
punishment a recidivist deserves., 60  Richard Singer, too, argues that
"defiance alone cannot, in a moral system, be a predicate of liability or of
increased liability.' 61
Why would anyone even think that the recidivist premium has anything
to do with punishing disobedience? According to George Fletcher, the posi-
tion may be that an "element of defiance" is "implicit in the behavior of
recidivists" because their "return[] to a life of crime demonstrates defiance of
the society and its institutions. 62 That is, despite being singled out and told
that they should not be doing something, they do it again, and that is the
sense in which punishing repeat offenders seems to involve punishing
disobedience. First-time offenders, not having been convicted and punished,
have not disobeyed because they have not been told that they should not have
broken the law, while those with criminal records have been told. Something
like this at least appears to be the intuition, and critics of the recidivist
law. Not only has he again infringed his victim's rights: he has closed his ears to the
authoritative voice of the law as it spoke to him through his previous punishments.
Id.
55. See VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 15, at 80, 79-80 ("A defiance
theory ... makes the treatment of recidivists depend on a particular (and rather authoritarian)
political doctrine that treats insubordination to state power as a wrong aside from any ... injury
resulting from the criminal act itself").
56. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal
Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 962 (2001) (suggesting that a recidivist's repeat offense
"reflects multiple acts of disobedience against the state and a disregard for its superior power").
57. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1436, 1436-37 ("By committing an offense after a previous
conviction, an offender might be seen as 'thumbing his nose' at the justice system.").
58. DUFF, supra note 54, at 168.
59. Von Hirsch, Record-Enhanced Sentencing, supra note 36, at 447; see also VON HIRSCH,
PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 15, at 79, 79-80 (arguing that the "idea of defiance as
something reprehensible in itself' is incongruent with liberal social values); VON HIRSCH &
ASHWORTH, supra note 18, at 149 ("Treating defiance in itself as an extra harm presupposes
authoritarian assumptions about the state and the criminal law.").
60. George P. Fletcher, The Recidivist Premium, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 54, 57 (1982).
61. SINGER, supra note 11, at 68.
62. Fletcher, supra note 60, at 57.
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premium in turn object on the basis that punishing disobedience is not
appropriate in a liberal society like ours.
63
The question is whether the critics' worry is warranted, and if so,
whether it is warranted for the right reasons. Even though there is an exten-
sive philosophical literature on the subject of obedience and authority of
law, 64 there is surprisingly little written (beyond conclusory statements) on
the question of whether the state may be morally justified in punishing
disobedience. Assessing this line of argumentation requires that we answer
the following three questions, each examined in order below: What is
disobedience? Is it really unjust to punish disobedience? How should we
think about the recidivist premium in relation to the idea of punishing dis-
obedience?
1. What Is Disobedience? Some Preliminary Distinctions.-
a. Lawbreaking and Disobeying.-In order to understand what is at
stake here, we need first to be clear on what disobedience is. First, consider
the term "obedience." If individuals go around in life never killing or raping,
do they "obey" the laws that prohibit such conduct? In a sense, yes, they do
because they do not break these laws. On the other hand, they do not "obey"
or "follow" the law; they merely behave in a way that does not involve
committing an act that is prohibited. They may be extremely lazy and never
do anything that takes the kind of energy involved in most cases of rapes and
murders. Also, especially for these kinds of offenses, some people would
behave the same way with or without laws that prohibit them, simply because
they are good people who behave morally at all times. If the thought of do-
ing acts that the law prohibits is not even a live possibility for these
individuals, they "obey" the law only in a very weak sense.
Obedience of the law, in other words, implies that a person does or
refrains from doing something for reasons that have to do with the existence
of a law. The purest instance of obedience would be the act of doing some-
thing or refraining from doing something just because that is what the law
requires. This is not the only kind of obedience, however. People may also
be prudent and obey the law because they want to avoid bad consequences
that follow from disobeying. These people are not following the law because
that is what the law requires. These people are following the law because the
consequences of not following would be unpleasant. Both instances of fol-
lowing the law should be considered instances of obedience because the
actors behave in ways that the law requires, either because that is what the
law requires or to avoid the sanctions attached to violations of what the law
63. FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 465, 464-66 (contrasting the case of a defiant teenager who
undermines parental authority with a liberal society where authorities are not entitled to react to a
"persistent" criminal as though their personal authorities were challenged).
64. For examples, see infra note 68.
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requires. The difference between the two is primarily attitudinal. The
former respects the law, whereas the latter need not have any particular
attitude towards the law. But both obey the law.
The flip side of this discussion is that disobedience can also show up in
different ways. People who break the law without realizing it are disobeying
the law in the sense that they do what they are told not to do, but the term
"disobeying" implies knowingly going against a directive that one is aware
of A farmer who produces foie gras by force-feeding his ducks without re-
alizing that foie gras production has been banned in his state may have
broken the law, but he has not disobeyed the law. In other words, it is possi-
ble for one to break the law without disobeying the law. It is also possible to
disobey the law without breaking the law. If a farmer who learns about the
ban on foie gras production decides to defy the law by continuing to produce
foie gras on his farm, he may have disobeyed the law but will not have bro-
ken the law if his violation takes place before the law goes into effect and he
does not realize that the law is not yet in effect.65
Also, disobeying the law can come in different flavors--disobeying, if it
is defined as a knowing violation of a directive--can be accompanied by
various attitudes, such as defiance, disrespect, disregard, denial, indifference,
or regret. Even if all are instances of disobedience, disobeying with a defiant
attitude is vastly different from disobeying with regret. Whether legal sanc-
tions should reflect such differences is not the issue at the moment, but it is
important to keep such nuances in mind when considering the question of
what it means for the state to punish disobedience.
b. Disobedience as Conduct or Attitude.-We must also distinguish
among the different senses in which one may be punished for defiance,
disobedience, insubordination, or disrespect. First, disobedience may be
insubordination, which is conduct, or disobedience may be a lack of respect,
which is an attitude or emotive state. Second, when punishing a recidivist,
disobedience may be punished as a distinct crime, or disobedience may be
thought of as a culpability enhancer that increases the seriousness of the
underlying offense.
An important clarification is in order. When I say disobedience may be
conduct, I include both physical acts and mental acts in my definition of
conduct. Disobeying an ordinary "No Parking" sign by parking in the
prohibited zone is a physical act of disobedience, whereas disobeying a
65. This example assumes that individuals can disobey a law that does not apply to them. Is
this a coherent possibility? I think so, although I cannot give a full justification for this view here.
If it were not a coherent possibility, an atheist would have a difficult time explaining what it is that
religious people are doing when they say they are "obeying God." Obedience or disobedience to a
nonexistent entity, in other words, is a conceptual possibility. Some may think these are cases of
attempted obedience or attempted disobedience and not cases of obedience or disobedience of
inapplicable directives. Which formulation is correct is not important for the purposes of the
distinction I am highlighting-the distinction between disobedience and lawbreaking.
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"Don't Even THINK of Parking Here" sign found in places in Manhattan by
giving the idea of parking there some consideration would be a mental act of
disobedience (if taking the sign literally). Because "thinking" of parking
there is active in the same way doing calculations in one's head is active,
mental acts can be distinguished from states of mind like one's attitude or
emotion towards these no-parking signs.6 6 This definition of conduct, I
concede, is somewhat idiosyncratic, especially given the backdrop of the act
requirement in criminal law, which is commonly thought to prohibit punish-
ing for thoughts, whether they are active (conscious deliberation) or passive
(thoughts that simply "occur" to one).67 But it is merely a definitional device
to aid analysis, and nothing of substance is meant to follow from it.
The attitude-conduct distinction and the crime-culpability distinction
are orthogonal. One may punish insubordination-or an act of
disobedience-as a distinct crime or as a culpability enhancer, and one may
punish a lack of respect-or a disobedient view or attitude-as a distinct
crime or as a culpability enhancer. There are, therefore, four possibilities:
punishing disobedience as conduct as an independent wrong; punishing dis-
obedience as conduct as a culpability enhancer; punishing disobedience as
attitude as an independent wrong; and punishing disobedience as attitude as a
culpability enhancer.
2. Is Punishing Disobedience Unjust?-
a. Some General Considerations.-With the preliminary issues out
of the way, we can now focus on whether punishment of disobedience is
unjust. We might start with the question of whether there is a general duty to
obey the law. There is a voluminous philosophical literature on this
question, and much of this literature is critical of the idea that there is such a
duty.68 If it were indeed the case that there is no such duty, would this mean
that it is unjust to punish disobedience?
The answer is no. The obligation to obey that is generally said not to
exist is "a general obligation applying to all the law's subjects and to all the
laws on all the occasions to which they apply., 69 This leaves open the
66. See Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 60, 87 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) (discussing mental acts);
cf Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 1, 9 (1990) (discussing the
"mental act" of defiance).
67. See Husak, supra note 66, at 86 (stating that punishment for thoughts is a category of
criminality clearly precluded by the act requirement).
68. E.g., LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 232-34 (1988); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 233-49 (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW]; JOSEPH RAZ, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, in ETHICS IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 341, 342 (1994); A. JOHN
SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 191-201 (1979).
69. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 68, at 234; see also William A. Edmundson,
State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215, 215-16 (2004) (explaining that
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following possibilities: there is an obligation to obey that applies to all the
law's subjects with regard to some laws on all the occasions to which they
apply; there is an obligation to obey that applies to some of the law's subjects
with regard to all laws on all the occasions to which they apply; there is an
obligation to obey that applies to all the law's subjects with regard to all laws
on some occasions to which they apply; or some other combination. And in
some of these instances, not only may the duty to obey exist, but the viola-
tion of the duty (as distinct from the violation of the law) may be a
punishable offense. In short, a proof against the existence of a general duty
to obey the law cannot help us answer when a duty to obey exists and when a
violation of such a duty is punishable.
Another debate that may seem relevant for our topic at first is the one
regarding civil disobedience. In a liberal democratic society like ours, in
which disobedience is sometimes thought to be a legitimate form of political
participation,7 ° the vision of the government's punishing its own citizens for
disobeying seems distasteful and dangerous. The romantic images of coura-
geous lawbreakers participating in lunch-counter sit-ins or refusing to move
to the back of the bus resonate powerfully. There is a debate over how the
law should respond to such situations of justifiable lawbreaking, 7' but what
seems clear is that there is a distinction between punishing civil disobedients
for engaging in acts that the law prohibits-such as trespassing-and pun-
ishing them for being disobedient or defiant. The former may be deemed
reasonable for rule-of-law reasons; the latter smacks of authoritarianism.
Thinking along such lines, one may arrive at the view that it is unjust for the
state to punish disobedience.
The problem with this argument, which takes the appeal of civil
disobedience as a way of rendering illegitimate the idea of punishing
defiance, is that civil disobedience is typically understood to be a special
the duty to obey the law as debated in the philosophical literature is a duty that is "comprehensively
applicable" and "universally borne").
70. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Civil Disobedience and Nuclear Protest, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 104, 105 (1985) ("Americans accept that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal
place in the political culture of their community .... People in the center as well as on the left of
politics give the most famous occasions of civil disobedience a good press, at least in retrospect.");
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 383 (1971) ("Along with such things as free and regular
elections and an independent judiciary empowered to interpret the constitution .... civil
disobedience used with due restraint and sound judgment helps to maintain and strengthen just
institutions.").
71. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206-22 (1977); DWORKIN,
supra note 70, at 113-14; KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS AND LAW AND MORALITY 271-85
(1989). The problem of how to respond to morally justifiable acts of civil disobedience is a specific
instantiation of the general problem of the "asymmetry of authority." For discussions of this
problem, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 128-34 (1991); Larry Alexander, Can Law
Survive the Asymmetry of Authority?, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 463 (2000); Larry Alexander, The
Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695 (1991); Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified,
90 MICH. L. REv. 2203 (1992).
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kind of lawbreaking that should be distinguished from ordinary offenses.
And those who have defended the use of civil disobedience are eager to place
strict conditions on permissible forms of lawbreaking under the banner of
justifiable civil disobedience. As Joseph Raz has summarized, it has been
argued by various theorists that civil disobedience, in order for it to be
justified,
must be used as a measure of last resort.. . ; it must be non-violent;
it must be openly undertaken; and its perpetrators must submit to
prosecution and punishment; such acts must be confined to those
designed to publicize certain wrongs and to convince the public and
the authorities of the justice of one's claims; it should not be used to
intimidate or coerce.72
We can have a debate over whether all of these conditions must be met for an
act of lawbreaking to be a genuine act of civil disobedience, but eliminating
all or most of these conditions would erase the distinction between civil dis-
obedience and ordinary lawbreaking. Given the importance of this
distinction, whatever doubts one may have about punishing defiance as a
general matter cannot be drawn from Rosa Parks's charisma.
In short, neither skepticism about the existence of the duty to obey the
law nor recognition of civil disobedience as a legitimate, justifiable form of
political advocacy has the reach to show that the government is not permitted
to punish disobedience. What the debates do show is that there are times
when lawbreaking is either morally neutral or desirable, but it is too quick to
go from that conclusion to the conclusion that punishment of disobedience is
unjust as a general matter.
72. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 68, at 269; see also GREENAWALT, supra note
71, at 226-43 (discussing various factors that justify disobedience); RAWLS, supra note 70, at 364,
371-77 (defining civil disobedience as "a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary
to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the
government"); H.A. Bedau, Civil Disobedience and Personal Responsibility for Injustice, in CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 49, 51 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991) (describing "paradigm cases" of
civil disobedience as acts that are illegal; are committed openly, nonviolently, conscientiously, and
within the framework of the rule of law; and are committed "with the intention of frustrating or
protesting some law, policy, or decision ... of the government"). It has further been observed:
There is all the difference in the world between the criminal's avoiding the public eye
and the civil disobedient's taking the law into his own hands in open defiance. This
distinction between an open violation of the law, performed in public, and a
clandestine one is so glaringly obvious that it can be neglected only by prejudice or ill
will. It is now recognized by all serious writers on the subject and clearly is the
primary condition for all attempts that argue for the compatibility of civil disobedience
with law and the American institutions of government.
HANNAH ARENDT, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 51, 75 (1972); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 105-13 (asserting that for civil disobedience to be acceptable, it must
embrace a working theory that rests not on the mere wickedness of a law, but instead on the
persuasiveness that disobedience is the appropriate response of those who view a certain law or
political decision as immoral or wrong).
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b. Justifiable Punishment of Disobedience: Obstruction of
Justice.-At least one thing is clear: If there is a general principle that
prohibits the government from punishing disobedience, it is a principle fre-
quently violated. Instances of criminalization of disobedience abound
throughout our legal system, and it is not at all the case that they are all
problematic.
The most obvious example of criminalization of disobedience is the
crime of contempt.73 It is a federal crime to "[d]isobe[y] or resist[] [a federal
court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command., 74  In
California, "[w]illful disobedience of the terms as written of any process or
court order or out-of-state court order, lawfully issued by any court" is a
misdemeanor.75 It is a crime in Delaware to "knowingly violate[] or fail[] to
obey any provision of a protective order issued by the Family Court or a
court of any state, territory or Indian nation in the United States. 76
Disobedience to law enforcement officers is punished as well. In New
York, it is a crime to "congregate[] with other persons in a public place and
refuse[] to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse" with "intent
to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a
risk thereof., 77  In Alaska, a person commits the crime of "disorderly
conduct" if "in a public place, when a crime has occurred, the person refuses
to comply with a lawful order of a peace officer to disperse," or if "in a pri-
vate place, the person refuses to comply with an order of a peace officer to
leave premises in which the person has neither a right of possession nor the
express invitation to remain of a person having a right of possession., 78 In
Massachusetts, it is a crime to "refuse[] or neglect[] to obey [a] command" to
"assist in arresting ... rioters or persons ... unlawfully assembled, or in sup-
pressing such riot or unlawful assembly. '79 In Ohio, it is a crime to "[flail to
obey the lawful order of any law enforcement officer engaged in the law en-
forcement officer's duties at the scene of or in connection with a fire,
accident, disaster, riot, or emergency of any kind."80
73. There may be a genuine question as to whether it is fair to view contempt as a "crime" or
whether it is in its own category. For a persuasive discussion that it should be thought of as a crime,
see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1603-06 (1997). For discussions
about the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, see Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 235-49 (1971); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt,
75 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000) (reviewing the history of the distinction).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
75. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 166 (West 2000).
76. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 1271A(2007).
77. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2000).
78. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110 (2006).
79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 2 (2000).
80. 01IO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.13(A)(3) (West 2000).
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"Resisting arrest" is also a crime. In California, for example, it is a
crime to "willfully resist[], delay[], or obstruct[] any public officer."81  In
Texas, it is a crime for a person to "intentionally refuse[] to give his name,
residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully ar-
rested the person and requested the information. 82 It is also a crime for a
person "lawfully released from custody ... on condition that he subsequently
appear" to "intentionally or knowingly fail[] to appear in accordance with the
terms of his release. 83 In Utah, it is a crime to "flee[] from or otherwise
attempt[] to elude a law enforcement officer.., after the officer has issued a
verbal or visual command to stop ... for the purpose of avoiding arrest. 84
These provisions criminalize disobedience-as conduct-and punish
people for their failures to obey commands by legal authorities in certain
situations; the fact that one did not do what one was told to do is precisely at
the heart of this type of criminality. 85 If it were truly the case that punishing
disobedience is illiberal, authoritarian, and thus impermissible, then these
laws would all be problematic as well. Are they? Do they all violate the
principle that a liberal state should not punish for disobedience?
It is not clear how such a position could be defended. Here is one
possible reason why that might be: the legal system needs to employ coercive
devices to ensure compliance with the law, because otherwise the rule of law,
presumably a valuable thing, could not become reality. The problem with
this rationale, however, is that the fact that the legal system needs the ability
to punish people for disobedience in order to administer justice is insufficient
to show that those who disobey the law in these contexts are blameworthy.
An argument that appeals to the system's need to punish is a consequentialist
argument, and a consequentialist argument in favor of a punishment by itself
is insufficient to demonstrate that the punishment is justified-no matter how
valuable the rule of law might be.86
At the same time, the observation that the legal system crucially
depends on the cooperation of those who are subject to it in order to function
as a legal system can serve as the basis for a moral obligation on the part of
the citizens. That is, a failure to obey government officials in certain situa-
tions interferes with the government's ability to carry out the functions of a
81. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 148(a)(1) (West 2000).
82. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02 (Vernon 2003).
83. Id. § 38.10.
84. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305.5 (2008).
85. See Dubber, supra note 56, at 959, 959-60 (describing laws that "explicitly criminalize acts
of disobedience"); Green, supra note 73, at 1608 ("Criminal contempt sanctions punish defendants
not for the underlying conduct in which they are engaged but rather for their defiance of a court
order."); cf JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 19-21 (1987) (distinguishing between "primary"
and "derivative" crimes).
86. Cf Douglas Husak, A Liberal Theory of Excuses, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 287, 291 (2005)
(book review) (raising concerns about the idea of denying criminal defenses on consequentialist
grounds instead of as a matter of "justice to the individual").
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legitimate state. Punishment of disobedience is justified in these instances
because persons have a moral duty not to interfere with workings of a legiti-
mate and reasonably just legal system,87 and those who violate such duties by
disobeying authoritative directives in these specified conditions are morally
culpable for that reason.
It should of course be kept in mind that the duty to obey legal officials
is not an absolute duty but a prima facie duty. There will be cases in which
the prima facie duty to obey is overridden by a competing consideration, if
the reasons to disobey are of correct kinds and of sufficient strength. But for
our purposes, the fact that there exists a prima facie duty to obey the orders
of government officials who are administering justice is enough to show that
punishment of disobedience in a liberal society can be permissible.
c. Justifiable Punishment of Disobedience: Disregard of Law.-
Another group of cases that raise the issue of whether the legal system does
or should punish for disobedience involves mistake-of-law defenses, a topic
we considered briefly above to the extent it was relevant to the "notice" ar-
gument for the recidivist premium. Here, we consider mistake-of-law cases
to answer a different question-whether the criminal law punishes people for
disobedience.
The controversy surrounding mistake-of-law defenses implicates two
types of concerns: legality and culpability. Legality concerns have to do with
whether there has been fair notice of the penal consequences of certain acts
that may appear innocent.88 Culpability concerns have to do with whether
people who do not realize that they are committing criminal acts can be said
to be criminally culpable. The issue in this debate is usually framed as
whether persons who have committed crimes without realizing that what they
did was prohibited by law (due to their mistaken beliefs about what the law
prohibits as opposed to about what they did, factually speaking) should be
allowed to raise the mistake-of-law defense. But the question that concerns
us here is the flip side of that inquiry-not whether persons who violate a
law without realizing it are morally innocent, but whether persons who
knowingly violate a law are culpable for reasons having to do not only with
the underlying badness of the conduct, but also with the fact that they are
disregarding a prohibition they know about.
In other words, it is important to see here that the mere fact that
sometimes knowledge of law is a required element of a crime does not show
that the crime punishes disobedience; there may be legality-based, as
87. WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, THREE ANARCHICAL FALLACIES: AN ESSAY ON POLITICAL
AUTHORITY 48-70 (1998); Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3, 9-10 (1993).
88. E.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("The rule that 'ignorance of the law
will not excuse' is deep in our law.... On the other hand.... [e]ngrained in our concept of due
process is the requirement of notice.").
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opposed to culpability-based, reasons for requiring such knowledge. 89 We
must do more work to see what difference knowledge of law makes in terms
of an offender's culpability, as opposed to the overallfairness of holding that
offender criminally liable (since fairness of criminal liability turns on not just
the blameworthiness of an offender, but also on fair-notice principles).
Working out a full theoretical answer to this question will take another
article. So, for the purposes of this Article, I will consider just a few exam-
ples that offer the strongest challenge to the idea that it is authoritarian,
illiberal, and impermissible for the state to punish disobedience. First con-
sider these examples. 90
1) A homeowner shoots and kills a trespasser. Is there a
difference in culpability between the homeowner who
shoots thinking she is legally entitled to kill and the
homeowner who shoots knowing that it is illegal to kill?
2) A man rapes his wife. If he rapes her under the mistaken
legal belief that the criminal legal prohibition of rape
does not apply to spousal rape, is he as culpable as a man
who rapes his wife knowing that spousal rape is included
within the definition of rape under the law that governs?
In scenarios (1) and (2), the knowledge that the conduct is a violation of
the law should not make a difference in whether the offender should be
convicted, as both offenders are inflicting direct harms on persons (physical
and otherwise). 91 The knowledge of law makes little difference in their
culpabilities, except in one respect. Let us assume that the homeowner and
the spousal rapist understand that murder is wrong and rape is wrong, but
they mistakenly consider what they are doing to be morally permitted be-
cause they believe their acts do not count as murder or rape. We could then
say that the homeowner and the rapist who disregard the knowing
prohibition, believing that they are morally justified in doing what they are
doing, are guilty not only of committing immoral acts (even if they did not
realize it was immoral), but also of ignoring society's judgments that shoot-
ing a trespasser is murder and nonconsensual sex with a spouse is rape. The
question is whether those who knowingly ignore prohibitions are, then, more
culpable than those who are not aware of the legal prohibitions simply be-
cause of this disregard. At least for these examples, it seems to me that the
89. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 13.01 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining that the rationale behind the rule that mistake of law is no defense is to avoid
subjectivity and fraud).
90. Many of these examples come from Husak and von Hirsch's article on mistake of law. See
generally Husak & von Hirsch, supra note 49.
91. Id. at 161-65.
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correct answer is yes. The difference in culpability between the unknowing
criminal and the knowing criminal may not be dramatic, but it is not insig-
nificant, either.
A few things must be emphasized about these two examples. First, not
all instances of disregarding the law are morally equivalent. Rape and mur-
der are two of the most serious crimes. Those who know and ignore the fact
that the acts they believe are morally and legally innocent are actually con-
sidered by society to be serious crimes worthy of stem condemnatory labels
like "murder" and "rape" are culpable not only for performing bad acts, but
also for disregarding societal judgments of morality. Second, the more seri-
ous the crime is, the less significant this "additional culpability" is in judging
the overall conduct. Because murder and rape are heinous offenses, the fact
that the actor engaged in them despite knowing that they are prohibited by
law is a relatively trivial component of the actor's overall level of culpability.
Now consider the following example:
3) An adult has consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old
believing that the legal age of consent is fourteen, when
it in fact is sixteen. Is he as culpable as an adult who has
sex with a fifteen-year-old while knowing that the legal
age of consent is sixteen?
In other words, would the adult be more culpable if he ignored the law
that says that his sex partner is under the legal age of consent than if he were
not aware of the law (or believed that the legal age of consent is fifteen)?
When contemplating sexual activity with a fifteen-year-old, with or without
statutory-rape laws, a responsible adult would think carefully about whether
the teenager is mature enough to give consent and whether the possibility of
sexual exploitation is present. In that sense, there is probably little difference
in culpability between a knowing violator and an unknowing violator.
However, knowledge of the legal prohibition makes a difference in that it at
least expresses the state's judgment as to the appropriate age of consent.
Ultimately, the adult might disagree with the state's judgment, in which case
he may be justified in going against the law. But disregard of the state's
judgment of the age of consent without a genuine and reasonable disagree-
ment adds a layer of culpability.92 It is this requirement of a genuine and
reasonable disagreement, as opposed to a thoughtless disregard of the age of
92. This may not always be the case. It is possible that the age of consent could be facially
absurd (say, thirty). Or, for some reason, the state could have lost its credibility over time as to the
rationality of its laws generally or of laws having to do with sexual relations. In such cases, it may
be the case that the state is not entitled to deference.
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consent, that constitutes the moral significance of one's knowledge of the age
of consent.
93
Examples (1) and (2) involve malum in se offenses, whereas example
(3), statutory rape, is a hybrid of malum in se and malum prohibitum
offenses. 94 The following two examples involve malum prohibitum offenses.
4) A driver does not update her car inspection because she
believes that she is required to inspect her car every year,
when the law actually requires an inspection every six
months. Is she more culpable than a driver who ignores
the biannual inspection law and gets his car inspected
only once a year?
In example (4), there is a moral difference between the driver who
does not update her car inspection because of a mistaken understanding of
the law and the driver who knows the law but does not comply with it. The
latter is someone who has decided that he should not be governed by the state
inspection law, the purpose of which is to ensure that cars that are on the
road meet minimum safety standards. It may be the case that he has a supe-
rior knowledge of his car and he is confident that the car does not pose a
danger to others on the road. But as in the case of statutory rape, the driver
would have to have a good safety-related reason to justify his disregard of the
state requirement.
And finally:
5) A person does not pay Social Security and Medicare
taxes for his housekeeper because he does not realize that
he is required to do so under the law. Is he more or less
culpable than someone who knows the legal requirement
and ignores it?
Example (5) involves a different moral principle than example (4).
Someone who does not pay taxes-not realizing that he owes them-is
different from someone who knows that he owes taxes and does not pay.
Example (5) is an instance in which ignorance of law is an excuse under
Cheek v. United States,95 in the sense that not knowing that one owes taxes
can serve as a defense to criminal prosecution. However, the point is not
whether knowing and unknowing tax evaders should both be prosecuted, but
93. Cf R.A. Duff, Crime, Prohibition, and Punishment, 19 J. APPLIED PHIL. 97, 104, 102-04
(2002) (arguing that a person who ignores the legal age of consent displays culpable "civic
arrogance").
94. See Douglas Husak, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism, in DEFINING CRIMES 65, 75
(R.A. Duff& Stuart P. Green eds., 2005).
95. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
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whether knowing evaders' disregard of what the law says they must do adds
a layer of culpability. Taxation is a way of raising public revenue in order to
put that revenue to public use, and the government has devised formulas to
determine how much each taxpayer must contribute to the general fund. A
knowing nonpayment is, in other words, an opt-out of the system of pay-
ments that makes it possible for the government to function.96
The point of all these examples is to show some situations in which it
would make sense to attribute some blame to disobedience. The situations in
which this holds true are difficult to generalize, but, as these examples show,
sometimes the existence of a rule, and a person's knowledge of it, change the
normative position that the person faces. Philosophers who are skeptical of
the duty to obey the law argue that if noncompliance does not result in an
injury, either to the interest protected by the law in question or to the system
of rule of law generally (through inducing others to disregard the law), then it
is permissible to disobey the law.97 Murder is an easy issue because noncom-
pliance would result in harm, and whether the law exists or does not exist
makes little difference, if any. But the point of these examples is that the
existence of law does make a difference, in a way that is separate from the
consequences of not obeying the law, that could be reduced to either a con-
crete injury to the interest protected by the law or to an undermining of the
rule of law through one's noncompliance with the law.
In short, the blameworthiness attributable to disobedience arises from
one's insufficient attention to why the law may be the way it is. Thus, we
might say that it would be proper for the state to punish people for their
disregard of the law. Two features of this idea should be noted. First,
disregard is neither physical conduct nor attitude; rather, it is a mental act,
meaning that punishing disregard would be an instance of punishing disobe-
dience as conduct. Second, to say that disregard is culpable is not to deny
that the duty to obey the law is not an absolute duty; there may be situations
where one is justified in disobeying the law. But the point is that one needs
to have a good reason to disobey the law, and it is this requirement that con-
stitutes the normative force of the existence of a law and one's awareness of
it.
3. Does the Recidivist Premium Punish Disobedience?-What does all
this have to do with the topic of this Article? Although it may seem that this
has been a long detour from the main subject matter, it was necessary in or-
der to evaluate many desert theorists' objection to the recidivist premium
96. Cf DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 37, 34-41 (1988) (basing the duty to obey the
law on the idea that "the wrong of lawbreaking lies in its unfairness to those who obey"); John
Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 9-10 (Sidney
Hook ed., 1964) (deriving one's obligation to obey laws from the duty of fair play); H.L.A. Hart,
Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955) (describing the duty of fair play).
97. SIMMONS, supra note 68, at 192-94.
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based on the following syllogism: (1) the recidivist premium punishes
defiance; (2) punishing defiance is unjust; (3) therefore, the recidivist
premium is unjust. 9 8 A full evaluation of this argument necessitates an
evaluation of step (2).
The discussion thus far has demonstrated that it would be too quick to
dismiss punishing disobedience as something that is not to be permitted.
And that is because there are at least two contexts in which punishment of
disobedience is acceptable. First, obstruction-of-justice crimes, such as con-
tempt and resisting arrest, are acceptable instances of the government's
punishment of disobedience. Under the scheme I introduced above, this
category of cases may be described as punishment of disobedience as
conduct and as an independent wrong. Second, at least in some situations,
individuals' awareness of the existence of a law prohibiting the conduct that
they are engaged in is significant in evaluating their blameworthiness. These
situations are also examples where the government may punish for
disobedience, or, more precisely, for disregard of law. This category of cases
I would describe as punishment of disobedience as conduct and as a
culpability-enhancer.
This conclusion-that punishment of disobedience is sometimes
justified-of course does not show that the recidivist premium is justified.
The question of whether the recidivist premium is one of the justifiable in-
stances of punishing disobedience remains. In order to answer this question,
we first have to describe the sense in which recidivists can be said to be
disobeying. And, as described above, the argument may be that recidivists,
having been singled out and told that they should not be doing something, do
it again, and that is the sense in which punishing repeat offenders may be a
type of punishing disobedience. So, assuming that disobedience (or
defiance) is culpable, or that it enhances culpability sometimes, does it make
sense to punish recidivists more for their disobedience?
It seems to me that neither of the two types of justifiable punishment of
disobedience identified above is analogous to the recidivist premium. First,
the obstruction-of-justice provisions criminalize failures to obey particular
directives that were individually created for particular persons. When a court
issues an order to a particular individual to testify at a trial proceeding, the
normative relationship between that individual and the court changes at the
moment the court issues the order. Before a court issues an order, no duty to
testify exists. But when a court issues the order, the recipient of the order has
a new obligation to the court. It is unclear how this idea applies in the con-
text of recidivism. When a person is convicted and punished, is it the case
that the person is now facing a special order not to commit a crime that did
98. See FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 466 (rejecting the recidivist premium on the ground that
defiance of legal authority does not make an offender more culpable in a liberal society based on the
rule of law); SINGER, supra note 11, at 68 ("[D]efiance alone cannot, in a moral system, be the
predicate of liability or of increased liability.").
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not exist before? A person who has been convicted of stealing was a
recipient of the message that stealing is prohibited before he committed the
crime, after he committed the crime, during the legal process, and after the
punishment. A special order for the convict that he should not commit a
crime does not change the content of the prohibition itself. His duty not to
break the law against stealing remains the same before, during, and after his
contact with the legal process.
Second, examples of culpability arising from disregard of the law are
not particularly analogous, either. The examples I have discussed to show
that punishment of disobedience may be permitted in certain situations draw
a contrast between those who know and those who do not know about the
existence of legal prohibitions. With knowledge of legal prohibitions comes
the possibility of disregarding legal prohibitions and disobeying the law. The
problem is that it is unclear what new knowledge is gained when persons are
punished. Their crimes were wrong before they committed them, and if they
did not know it, they should have known it, which is the idea behind the
maxim that ignorance of law is no excuse. There is no new notice that is cre-
ated due to a legal proceeding. The crime was illegal before, during, and
after the conviction. For certain crimes, it is possible that defendants actually
may not have known about the illegality of their conduct, and for such cases,
it may make sense to punish those defendants more if they are convicted for
the same crime the second time. But, barring such situations, what additional
knowledge does one gain about the undesirability of criminal conduct once
one is apprehended, convicted, and punished?
The recidivist-premium context is different from the obstruction-of-
justice context and the disregard-of-law context, but that does not show that
the recidivist premium is illegitimate, of course. Rather, the argument is
this: In the obstruction-of-justice context, those subject to official orders have
duties created by those orders, and those not subject to those official orders
do not have the same duties. In the disregard-of-law context, those who are
aware of the law have the duty to pay it due regard, but those who are not
aware of the law do not have a duty to pay it due regard. However, the dif-
ference between recidivists and first-time offenders is unclear. They are both
presumed to know the law, so we cannot infer that one disregarded the law
and the other one did not. And both are under a duty to comply with the law,
not just those who have been punished. Thus, there is no difference between
first-time offenders and repeat offenders in terms of specific duties to obey
that have been violated.
The only new command or knowledge gained by an offender, it appears,
has to do with the fact that particular legal actors bothered to deliver an indi-
vidually tailored condemnation on the offender. But because the "additional"
command or awareness is essentially redundant, it is hard to see what new
normative significance it generates. Without a new normative significance,
the additional command or awareness cannot carry the weight of justifying
the recidivist premium. Further, attempts to justify the recidivist premium on
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such a thin rationale simply confirm the suspicion that the recidivist premium
is merely a loud cry by an authoritarian figure demanding obedience or else,
which is hardly an attractive picture.
In short, even if it is the case that disobedience can be culpable, it is
unclear whether we can justify punishing repeat offenders more than first-
time offenders on the basis that repeat offenders are disobedient and first-
time offenders are not.
IV. Recidivism as Omission
A. The Basic Idea
The recidivist premium is a mystery. The intuition that repeat offenders
deserve more punishment is strong and widespread. 99 But once we strip
away the prevention ("keep them off streets") justification, we seem to be left
with a character argument ("recidivists are bad people who deserve
more"),"°0 a notice argument ("recidivists know what they are doing is
wrong"), 0 1 and a defiance argument ("recidivists show defiance by
reoffending")°0 2-none of which hold up to scrutiny. At this point, we have
several options. First, we may throw up our hands and think that this is just
one of those features of our desert judgments that seem difficult to rationalize
but are here to stay. Second, we may conclude that the recidivist premium is
not justifiable as a matter of desert and seek ways to eliminate or limit it so
that our sentencing is consistent with principles of desert. Third, we can at-
tempt a different argument, and that is the task of this Part.
I have considered various arguments for the recidivist premium above,
and although they all differ theoretically, they essentially fail for one reason.
It is difficult to make a good argument as to why repeat offenders are, in
principle, different from first-time offenders when we focus on the badness
of their characters or badness of their acts. The fault of these arguments, I
would argue, is twofold. First, the arguments take a snapshot of the
offenders' character traits or bad acts at the moment of their reoffending.
This is a mistake. The key to understanding the recidivist premium lies in
seeing that a self continues over time, and that the self at t, can influence
what the self does at t2. Second, the theories approach the question of indi-
vidual culpability by focusing on the individuals in question in isolation, and
by focusing on their acts or character traits. This, too, is a mistake. The key
to the recidivist premium lies not just in evaluating an individual's act of
reoffending or bad character traits. Rather, the focus should be on the
ongoing relationship between the offender and the state.
99. See supra notes 7-10.
100. Seesupra Part 11.
101. See supra subpart 111(A).
102. See supra subpart 111(B).
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One of the conceptual difficulties of the recidivist premium is that if we
focus on the moment of offending, the offense does not look, at least at first,
any different, no matter who commits it-whether it was a repeat offender or
a first-time offender. The first step out of this conundrum is to see that
criminal offenses-like many acts that we undertake in life-do not happen
in isolation. A series of events and circumstances can combine to produce a
moment ripe for a crime to take place. This in turn means that well before
individuals end up committing crimes, they can steer their lives in different
directions in order to minimize the risk of finding themselves in a position in
which committing a criminal offense becomes a compelling-or at least
appealing-option.
One way to think about this is to divide up an individual's life into
different selves, as in the self at to, the self at ti, at t2 , t3 , t4 , and so on.
103
What a past self does at to can powerfully shape the choices that the future
self faces at, say, t4. To use a mundane example, a person on a diet might
decide at to to travel out of the way to avoid passing next to a fast-food joint
at tl. A person who has a tendency to overspend at grocery stores might eat
at to to avoid grocery shopping at tl on an empty stomach. Obviously, how
one finds oneself in situations that tempt or induce one to commit a crime is a
far more complicated matter. 1°4 But a person who thinks that she has a ten-
dency to give in to peer pressure to commit criminal acts may stay away
from those who are likely to encourage her to engage in criminal activities.
If a person understands that having no source of income may lead him down
the path of a life of a criminal, he could try to find a job to support himself
and his family. If a person's drug addiction leads her to look for quick bucks
through burglary, then perhaps combating the drug addiction could lead to a
life away from crime. If a person is tempted to molest children whenever he
is around children, he can organize his life in a way that minimizes his con-
tact with children. The point is that for every crime that a self commits at tx,
103. The discussion that follows draws from the social-scientific literature on self-control and
precommitment. The focus of such studies is on the ways in which the self at t, can make decisions
in advance in order to influence behaviors at t, + ., which has obvious parallels to the way I am
thinking about the problem of the recidivist premium here. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 4-87 (2000);
RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 84-95 (1995); HOWARD RACHLIN, THE SCIENCE OF
SELF-CONTROL 27-56 (2000); RICHARD H. THALER WITH GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, Intertemporal
Choice, in THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES IN ECONOMIC LIFE 92, 92-106
(1992); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443, 443-44
(1997); James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359, 375 (1992).
104. The starting point of such an inquiry should be the issue of how individuals' environments
can constrain and shape their available options. Many have pointed out the importance, when
studying criminal behavior, of understanding such interactions between individuals and the
environments they inhabit. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE
MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 99-122 (1993); Anthony E. Bottoms
& Paul Wiles, Environmental Criminology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 620,
634-35 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crime and Social
Interactions, 111 Q.J. ECON. 507, 508 (1996).
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we can find other "guilty" selves at tx-, preceding the self at t, who
committed the crime. Loosely speaking, we might even say that one's past
self, through a series of missteps, can aid and abet a self in committing a
crime by increasing the risk that the future self would commit that crime.
So what does this have to do with the recidivist premium? I am
suggesting that the recidivist premium is not about what an offender does or
reveals at the moment a crime is committed; rather, the recidivist premium is
additional punishment directed at the previous selves who enabled the later
self to commit a crime. The recidivist premium does not punish disobedi-
ence or bad character; rather, it punishes an ex-offender's omission-the
omission being his failure to take steps to prevent himself from committing
another crime.105
I am here making analogies to both omission liability and complicity
liability. It is no accident that these two types of liability are paired together
for my purposes. Omission liability and complicity liability can be thought
of as what George Fletcher has called "derivative liability.' 0 6  Fletcher ex-
plains that failing to intervene to prevent a harm and helping someone else
commit a crime are "derivative" in the sense that neither conduct is sufficient
for liability.'0 7 In the omission context, the ultimate harm must occur in or-
der for the omitter to be held liable. In the complicity context, the principal
must commit a crime in order for the helper to be held liable. 10 8 These two
forms of liability are derivative also in the sense that there is a causal gap
between the omitter and the harm that ultimately results, as well as between
the helper and the crime that ultimately occurs. 10 9 If a parent is liable for
105. Stephen Morse has made a similar argument in the context of preventive detention, which
he defines as the state practice of "interven[ing] in the life of a citizen, who, at the time of the
intervention, has neither done nor attempted to present harm, but who poses a substantial risk of
doing so." Morse, supra note 13, at 114. He suggests that we expand the crime of reckless
endangerment by criminalizing the "failure to commit oneself voluntarily or to take other
reasonably effective steps to avoid causing future harm" by persons who have had "prior
conviction[s] of at least one serious crime of violence, or at least one prior occurrence of
involuntary civil commitment for actual serious violent conduct" and have "conscious awareness of
an extremely high risk that [they] will in the immediate future cause substantial unjustified harm."
Id. at 152. Under this proposal, "[t]he crime is complete when the agent recklessly fails to take the
steps reasonably necessary to avoid harmdoing." Id. I should also note that Morse has offered the
proposal as a "purely heuristic" device and does not favor adopting it for reasons of privacy and
administrative difficulties. Id. at 152 n. 126. Our proposals have a number of differences-in the
aims and contents of the proposals themselves and in the theoretical justifications for them. See,
e.g., infra note 117. However, one commonality here is the idea that individuals' failures to prevent
themselves from committing crimes can be culpable.
106. See FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 581-85; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause
and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985) (explaining
that complicity liability is derivative in that it is dependent upon a principal violation of the law).
107. FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 583.
108. Id. at 583-84.
109. The ideas of "causation" by omission and "causation" by complicity are controversial, and
there is much written about the two subjects. It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve these
issues, but some idea of causal connections between omission and result, and complicity and result,
is stable and robust enough for our purposes. On causation by omission, see, for example,
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manslaughter for not seeking medical attention for his child when the child is
ill, it is the illness that harms the child, and the parent's role in the occurrence
is merely that he failed to prevent the illness from harming the child. If a
helper is liable for helping the principal commit a crime, it is the principal
who commits the crime, not the helper."l0 Recidivism as omission, as I envi-
sion it, has a similar structure. The culpability of the self at to who has
enabled the self at t10 to commit a crime derives from the badness of the
crime committed by the self at tho. Of course, since there is only one actor in
the context of recidivism, the punishment for the repeat offense takes into
account both the culpability of the selves at to-9 and the self at t,0.
Above, we saw that all the competing accounts of the recidivist
premium have a flaw: It is not clear that first-time offenders lack whatever
feature supposedly distinguishes repeat offenders under any particular theory.
So, one may object, is it not the case that my proposal suffers from the same
problem? Do we not demand that all persons organize their lives so that they
steer clear of criminality? Why is it not the case that when first-time offend-
ers are being punished, they are being punished not only for committing the
crimes with which they are charged, but also for their failures to live life in a
way that would have allowed them to steer clear of criminality?
The answer is that there is a difference between a first-time offender and
a repeat offender because a repeat offender has gone through the process of
conviction and punishment and a first-time offender has not. When a person
is convicted and punished for a crime, one thing we can say with confidence
is that the relationship between that person and the state has changed in a
way that makes that person different from others who have not had that kind
FEINBERG, supra note 85, at 165-86; DOUGLAS HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 156-86
(1987); MOORE, supra note 14, at 267-78; Helen Beebee, Causing and Nothingness, in CAUSATION
AND COUNTERFACTUALS 291, 291-308 (John Collins et al. eds., 2004); Sarah McGrath, Causation
by Omission: A Dilemma, 123 PHIL. STUD. 125, 125-48 (2005). On causation by complicity, see,
for example, CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 168-71
(2000); John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 133-41 (2007); Kadish,
supra note 106, at 355-68; Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289, 289-
305 (2007); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 395, 395-452 (2007). Another related idea here is that of "tracing" in moral
philosophy. Tracing refers to "the idea that responsibility for some outcome need not be anchored
in the agent or agent's action at the moment immediately prior to outcome, but rather at some
suitable time prior to the moment of deliberation or action." Manuel Vargas, The Trouble with
Tracing, 29 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 269, 269 (2005); see also JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK
RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 49-51 (1998)
(describing the role of tracing in morality and causation). See generally John Martin Fischer &
Neal A. Tognazzini, The Truth About Tracing, NOUS (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the
Texas Law Review) (defending the idea of tracing as a viable component of moral responsibility).
110. I do not mean to imply here that "attempted omission" or "attempted complicity" is absurd
or non-existent. The aim here is merely to explain how "recidivism as omission" is to be
conceptualized. Cf Kadish, supra note 106, at 356 (explaining that his explication of complicity as
containing a "result" requirement is not meant to preclude the possibility of the concept of attempt
to complicity).
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of encounter with the state. It is this change in relationship that changes the
normative positions of persons with regard to the state.
The idea that obligations arise from relationships is a familiar concept in
law."'1 The most straightforward relationship that can give rise to obligations
in law is one created by a promise, but bases for obligations need not always
be voluntary. For instance, family is often given as a paradigmatic example
of an association that gives rise to obligations despite the fact that it is not-
or at least not fully-voluntary."12 Even though phrases like "paying one's
debt to society" imply that once individuals have been punished, they start
with a clean slate, the idea that punishment puts people back to where they
were before flies in the face of our everyday experiences. One's life cannot
be thought of as simply one event after another, one encounter after another,
each of which is discrete and disconnected from the others. "After all we
have been through," a phrase that typically precedes a normative statement,
is not an idle phrase; it is a way of emphasizing the different normative ex-
pectations that arise as a result of what "we have been through." What we
expect of one another is shaped by what we have been through, and different
relationships people enter into (voluntarily or involuntarily) can inject new,
morally significant elements into their lives.
What kinds of morally significant duties or obligations exist as a result
of the existence of a relationship depend on the nature of the relationship
itself. Obviously, merely spending time with someone does not give rise to
obligations. If a person beats me up every day for several days and later I
notice that the person who assaulted me is drowning, there may or may not
be a duty for me to rescue my assailant, depending on a number of factors."
13
However, it would be absurd for anyone to argue that I have a duty to rescue
him because we have had a relationship. Everything about the argument
111. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a contract as a
promise that creates an enforceable legal duty); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)
(listing several types of special relationships that create a duty to act in tort law).
112. There are obvious parallels here to the idea of "associative obligations," which has been
extensively discussed in the literature on the duty to obey the law. See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 190-216 (1986); Stephen Perry, Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey
the Law, in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 183, 183-206
(Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006). Accounts of associative obligations forming a basis for political
obligations are controversial. For criticisms, see Denise R~aume, Is Integrity a Virtue?: Dworkin 's
Theory of Legal Obligation, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 380, 380-409 (1989); A. John Simmons,
Associative Political Obligations, 106 ETHICS 247, 259-61 (1996). Whether their criticisms apply
to the argument I am advancing here turns on the moral justifiability of the institution of punishment
and of the relationships that the institution creates.
113. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) ("The fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not
of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."). But see, e.g., id § 314A (stating that a
common carrier and innkeeper have a duty to render aid when they know a passenger or customer is
ill or injured); id. § 322 (stating that actors who know that their conduct has placed others in a
position where they will suffer further harm are under a duty to render aid); id. § 324 (stating that
one who undertakes to aid a person who is ill or injured is liable for any harm resulting from
discontinuing that aid).
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being advanced here thus turns on the nature of the relationship between an
offender and the state.
The nature of the offender-state relationship is as follows. The
institution of punishment has a communicative, expressive dimension. When
the state punishes, it condemns what the offender has done as blameworthy
and it communicates to the offender that what he has done is wrong. Implicit
in that message, of course, is that the offender is being punished for what he
has done, and after his punishment is complete, he shall not offend again.
This is one way in which punishments that carry stigma are different from,
say, receiving a parking ticket. The message that people experience when
they receive a parking ticket is not, "Do not park illegally again," but, "If you
park illegally and you are caught, you have to pay." By contrast, when a per-
son is convicted of rape, the message given is, "What you did was wrong,
and you cannot do it again," not, "If you rape again and you are caught, you
have to serve time." The possibility of committing the crime again should
not even be contemplated, as the whole point of criminal prohibition is that
some things just should not be done.
Now, if the process of conviction and punishment communicates the
message that what the offenders have done is wrong and they should not do it
again, the process also should prompt a period of reflection on the part of
offenders to determine how they ended up committing the prohibited act.
This kind of self-diagnosis, aided by the institution of punishment, should
identify what has gone wrong in an offender's life. People may end up
committing crimes for different kinds of reasons, and those reasons differ for
different types of offenses. Such diagnoses should lead to appropriate pre-
scriptions for each offender, and each offender should follow those
prescriptions while and after serving a sentence. A repeat offense by some-
one who has gone through this process of reflection, diagnosis, and
prescription justifies the inference that, for whatever reason, the prescription
was not followed, and the offender failed to prevent herself from reoffending
by failing to organize her life in a way that steers clear of criminality.
Some may object that none of this is unique to repeat offenders. Those
without criminal histories have the ability to know themselves and to under-
stand the kinds of factors that lead people into situations in which they end
up committing a crime. First-time offenders may have taken each step lead-
ing to their crimes knowing exactly what they were doing and understanding
that each step was leading them closer to the commission of a crime. Also,
as mentioned above, those who are convicted of a crime for the first time are
not necessarily those who have committed only one crime in their lives.
Some may already have an impressive criminal background without ever
having been caught. If my argument holds, and that those who are convicted
of crimes know themselves well enough to know what kinds of things lead
them down the path of the criminal, then that argument should apply to those
first-time offenders who have good understandings of such factors as well.
And if that is the case, then my argument ceases to become an argument in
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favor of singling out an offender's criminal history as a significant
aggravating factor.
However, this objection misses the point that the crucial difference
between first-time offenders and repeat offenders is that the repeat offender
has gone through a process with the state that has created a relationship with
the state, and the point of that relationship was to ensure that whatever led
the offender to the status of being a convict should be avoided in the future.
It is that history of having had that relationship that first-time offenders lack.
And once a person enters into a thick relationship with the state through the
process of conviction and punishment, it is appropriate for the state to attrib-
ute blame to how a person has increased the risks of criminal wrongdoing
over time.
Why should the state not apply the same kind of scrutiny to first-time
offenders? The answer is that we have a society that respects individual
autonomy. We provide space for people to feel free to move about as long as
they do not cross certain boundaries. And if a person crosses a boundary, it
is likely that the person's wrongdoing was not only in doing the prohibited
act, but also in taking the steps leading up to the prohibited act. But such
steps leading up to the prohibited act should not be what the state concerns
itself with; they are none of the state's business. However, it all becomes the
state's business once the offender and the state enter into a relationship the
sole point of which is to recognize that what the offender did was wrong and
should not be done again.
At the same time, this proposal does not require the institution of
punishment to seek a transformation of an offender's character or soul. The
message is, "We are making you go through the process of conviction and
punishment because you crossed certain lines, and we don't want you to
cross those lines again." This is very different from the message, "We are
making you go through the process of conviction and punishment because
you are a bad person, and we want you to come out of the process a good
person." Perhaps some of these people have desires to hurt others that they
never rid themselves of. But if that is the case, they must find ways to
weaken or suppress those desires, or to organize their lives in ways that help
them avoid situations in which those desires are triggered and avoid opportu-
nities to act on such desires. But what is not required of them is to transform
themselves into people with different traits, preferences, and attitudes.'1 14
It is important to be clear here that I am not suggesting a new command
during the process of conviction and punishment that states that offenders
must now "get their acts together" and that the recidivist premium is for
offenders' violations of that command. There would be several problems
with positing that kind of command in explaining the recidivist premium.
114. This is one way in which my account differs from rehabilitation theories of punishment.
For a quick discussion of the rehabilitation approach to sentencing, see Andrew Ashworth,
Sentencing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY, supra note 104, at 1076, 1079-80.
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First, it is not likely that such a command is actually part of the meaning of
the process of conviction and punishment, whereas it seems incontrovertible
that the process of conviction and punishment carries the message that the
offender should not reoffend. Second, a regime of such commands already
exists in the form of probation, parole, and supervised release. A command-
centered account would then have two sets of parallel commands-explicit
commands and implicit commands-and it is unclear why the explicit com-
mands would not simply "occupy the field" and become an exclusive set of
commands. The account advanced here avoids this problem by focusing in-
stead on the nature of the offender-state relationship, and the kinds of
normative expectations that are raised once the offender enters into that
relationship.
I should also make clear that by arguing that we should think of the
recidivist premium as punishment for "omission," I am only making an
argument for interpreting the idea of imposing additional punishment for re-
peat offenders. I am not advocating a creation of the new crimes of "failure
to fix your own life" or of "aiding and abetting your future self to commit
another crime." In other words, the idea is not to create a situation where
individuals are punished for failing to reform even though they never
reoffend. Say a person commits a crime and is convicted, and once he
completes his sentence, he goes back to his old way of living. Despite the
fact that he-call him an "unrepentant law-abider"-never shows any sign
that he has rearranged his life in order to steer clear of criminality, he mi-
raculously never commits a crime. My argument thus far does not imply that
the unrepentant law-abider should be punished because, after all, he is a law
abider." 5 A prior offender's act of offending again should give rise to an
inference that the offender helped himself commit another crime, and it is on
the basis of that inference that we can justify imposing additional
punishment. However, that does not mean that the failure to prevent oneself
from committing another crime need be criminalized by itself; it can simply
be a culpability enhancer, the same way in which hatred is not a crime but is
a culpability enhancer for racially motivated crimes.
On the flip side, some may wonder whether an inference that there was
a failure to reform is always justified when assessing re-offenders. It is easy
to imagine a "repentant law-breaker," a mirror image to the unrepentant law-
abider. It is possible for a person to be convicted and punished, and then
once she completes her sentence, she acts like a model citizen. She cleans up
her act, finds a job, avoids her criminal friends, and so on, but, for whatever
reason, she finds herself back in court for committing some crime. Or, even
worse, she attempts to clean up her act, find a job, and avoid her criminal
friends, but she finds that her options post-incarceration are few and far
115. For a contrasting perspective on this point, in the context of preventive detention, see
Morse, supra note 13, at 152.
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between, and all her attempts to rearrange her life fail. It seems unfair to
punish such a person for failure to reform when they re-offend.
How to deal with situations like these is not easy to determine, and
would depend on individual situations. For the purposes of this paper, I
would only say the following. First, it seems that the repentant-law-breaker
scenario is the kind of situation where repeat offenders might say things like,
"I couldn't help it," and, "I could not do otherwise," because they might have
tried to do everything possible to set their lives straight but failed anyway.
But such excuses are codified in the criminal law as formal defenses such as
duress or insanity, and if a repeat offender's repeat offense can somehow fall
into one of those categories, then there can be a genuine defense against the
recidivist premium--or even against the conviction for the re-offense
itself. 16 Second, the inference of the offender's failure to reform need not be
absolute, meaning that it may be rebutted by the offender.' '7 Similarly, one
could also imagine allowing partial or full excuses for one's failure to
reform. Although details as to how to design a system of full and partial
rebuttals and excuses cannot be worked out here, it seems to me that repeat
offenders ought to be able to present the ways in which they have tried to
steer clear of criminality and, depending on the reasonableness and sincerity
of their attempts, receive a reduction in the recidivist premium." 1
8
116. One difficult issue lurking in the background here is whether the legal system should
recognize something like a partial or full "social-adversity defense." For discussions of social-
adversity defense, see MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 134-48, 163-64 (paperback ed. 1996); and VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 18, at
62-74. I cannot resolve the social-adversity-defense debate here; I only note that how that debate is
resolved would have obvious implications for when the recidivist premium would be unavailable.
117. Some might wonder here why the burden of proving that there was a failure to reform is
not on the government and why the burden of proving that there was an attempt to reform is on the
defendant. The reason for this is that the state is, ultimately, too far removed from individuals to
know how they ought to reform their lives. The state can listen to individuals' stories as to how
they have tried to reform and understand them, but how a particular individual is to avoid a life of
crime is not information that the state has access to, given the individual variations and opacity of
the internal lives of individuals. There are many ways of living a law-abiding life, and they cannot
and should not be specified by the state. A broader point here is that it is inappropriate to have an
absolute rule barring presumptions that go against criminal defendants just because we are in the
criminal context; a more general articulation of the proper relationship between citizens and the
state must come first. For a discussion of some of the general issues involved in determining when
legal presumptions are appropriate, see R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the
Presumption of Innocence, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125, 137-43 (A.P. Simester ed.,
2005). It is true that through probation and parole conditions and such, the state does keep an eye
on how ex-offenders return to a life of normalcy. But that, it seems to me, does not show that the
state has any special insight as to how to live a law-abiding life; such post-release conditions are
more about the state's maintaining a tight control over each individual-in a way privileging one
state-chosen way of staying out of trouble-and less about the state knowing what is good for each
individual.
118. For a similar suggestion, see ROBERTS, supra note 5, at 220-22.
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B. Advantages over Competing Accounts
My account has several advantages over competing accounts of the
recidivist premium. First, it explains and justifies the extra resentment felt
against repeat offenders. Given that the point of the punishment system is to
express and communicate blameworthiness of criminal conduct, another of-
fense by someone who has been punished can be an indication that the
person has failed to rearrange his life in a way that ensures that he does not
offend again. The special kind of resentment that people may feel about a
repeat offender stems from the feeling that we have all been through this
before. The purpose of the institution of punishment is to forcefully drive
home the point that what the offender did was wrong and should not be done
again, not just the point that what the offender did carries a price. Once of-
fenders have gone through that kind of process, the expectation is for them to
change their ways of life, and the extra resentment arises from that
expectation. Arguments against the recidivist premium or arguments for a
sentencing differential that is solely based on first-time-offender mitigations
have trouble explaining and justifying this intuition.
Second, recidivism as omission does not suffer from the problems that
plague obedience- or character-based accounts of the recidivist premium.
Both obedience and character arguments have the same weakness; it is not
clear why one's criminal record-reflecting not necessarily the number of
times one has committed a crime, but the number of times one has been
caught and punished-should be privileged as a way of getting at a person's
bad character or disobedience. First-time offenders can have bad character
traits or can act in rebellion against the state, just as repeat offenders can re-
peat without having permanent "criminal" traits or rebelling against
authority. By tying the recidivist premium to additional obligations that arise
from the relationship that an offender and the state enter into with each other,
my account avoids such problems.
Third, by specifying exactly what the wrongdoing consists of, my
proposal gives more guidance as to what amount of extra punishment is
appropriate. When one encounters habitual-offender statutes, two reactions
are common. One, some kind of additional punishment is appropriate. Two,
the additional punishment should not be "too much." Accounts that focus on
disobedience or bad character traits have trouble placing a principled limita-
tion on the size of the recidivist premium. If an offender has bad character
traits that are deeply ingrained and irremediable, how much additional
punishment is appropriate? If an offender has rejected the idea of playing by
the rules, how much additional punishment is appropriate? It is unclear
whether any principled limitation can be placed on the size of the recidivist
premium. In fact, arguments based on character or defiance have a tendency
to recommend large increases in punishment without encountering any
meaningful resistance, simply because what justifies the additional punish-
ment is an abstract "harm" of being a "bad person" or "defying authority."
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By contrast, my account of the recidivist premium takes into account the
belief that some additional punishment is appropriate, but places a ceiling on
it because the wrongdoing does not consist of the abstract harm of being de-
fiant of authority, rejecting society's norms, or being a heinous human being.
Rather, the wrongdoing we are concerned with has to do with living one's
life in a way that is insufficiently far away from criminal activity. And given
that the recidivist premium punishes for increasing the risk of a criminal
activity, as opposed to punishing for engaging in the criminal activity itself,
the appropriate punishment for recidivism should be less than the punishment
for the crime itself. This is why I believe habitual-offender statutes prescribe
punishments that are too harsh and excessive in just- deserts terms. The re-
cidivist premium is for the wrong of failing to set one's life straight, which
increases the risk of a subsequent offense; but such a failure should not lead
to a punishment that is harsher than the punishment for the second (or third,
or whatever) offense itself.
C. Government as a Responsible Party?
Finally, the account advanced here opens up a new line of inquiry that,
in my view, should always be part of the recidivist-premium calculus-the
idea of assigning to the state at least partial blame for an offender's
recidivism. As I have been stressing, the engine that drives the recidivist
premium is the relationship between the state and the offender, the point of
which is to acknowledge that what the offender has done is wrong. And im-
plicit in that relationship is a commitment on the part of the offender to
organize his life in a way that steers clear of criminality so that he does not
re-offend. Like most relationships, this is a relationship that places obliga-
tions on all parties involved. In the same way that the relationship between
an offender and the state allows the state to take a closer look at how an of-
fender carries out his life, the state also has a heightened responsibility
towards the offender-namely, to help him get back to a life of normalcy or
at least to not interfere with an offender's effort to become a law-abiding
citizen. In other words, if the recidivist premium is imposed for one's failure
to set his life straight postconviction, if what justifies the recidivist premium
is the relationship between the individual and the state, and if the moral logic
of the relationship necessitates the parties' commitment that the offender
should organize his life in order to prevent another offense, then it seems to
follow that the state has a role to play in helping the offender live a life away
from crime as well.
This last implication is especially significant for the recidivism issue
because there are serious and legitimate concerns that the increasing puni-
tiveness of the American criminal justice system in the past few decades has
had the perverse effect of driving up the rate of recidivism. Many offenders
who are released from prison frequently face daunting prospects as they try
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to get their lives back in order. First, they will find that, because of their
felony convictions, they are excluded from public housing.' 19 Second, they
will find that they not only are excluded from housing, but also are excluded
from a source of income because their felony convictions make them ineligi-
ble for welfare. 120 Third, if they seek to get education to improve their lots,
they will find another stumbling block if they were convicted of a drug-
related offense, as Congress has made such people ineligible for student
loans. 121 Fourth, they will find that they may not be able to find jobs as
teachers or child-care workers due to various laws regarding the eligibility of
individuals with criminal records. 122 Fifth, even if they somehow find jobs,
they will find that they cannot drive there because of laws that revoke or sus-
pend their driver's licenses because of their felony backgrounds.
12 3
In short, as the recidivist premium has increased in the past few
decades, various government policies have simultaneously made it difficult
for ex-offenders to pursue normal lives by denying them housing, welfare,
education, certain jobs, and the ability to drive to work. On top of all of this,
ex-offenders are hit with the ultimate symbol of exclusion: denial of the right
to vote. The connection between the lack of the right to vote and recidivism
may be a bit more tenuous than the connection between recidivism and the
lack of basic needs such as food, housing, and education. However, those
who commit crimes tend to be those who feel alienated from the mainstream
119. See Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing-Denial of Benefits to
Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 37, 40-43 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) [hereinafter INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT] (discussing the lifetime ban on eligibility for Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) benefits for individuals with felony drug convictions); Jeremy Travis, Invisible
Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra, at 15, 23-24
(pointing out that federal statutes authorize the exclusion of certain offenders from public housing);
see also Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 153, 158 (1999) (noting that federal law bars
distribution of certain welfare benefits to those convicted of some crimes).
120. E.g., IND. CODE § 12-14-1-1(c) (2007) (barring felons from receiving assistance under
Indiana's Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program for ten years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-
709(d)(4) (2007) (prohibiting those found guilty of certain crimes from receiving some forms of
state assistance); see also Travis, supra note 119, at 23 (discussing legislation that has cut offenders
off from welfare).
121. Travis, supra note 119, at 18; see also Higher Education Act of 1998, 20 U.S.C. §
1091 (r)(1) (2004) (limiting the ability of those convicted of drug-related offenses to receive student
loans unless they complete a rehabilitation program).
122. Travis, supra note 119, at 22; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-414(b) (2007)
(preventing those convicted of certain crimes from gaining employment as nonlicensed staff in
public schools); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 45125.01(d) (West 2006) (establishing a system to make
criminal records of school-district employees available to superintendents); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
20-195p (1999) (permitting disciplinary action to be taken against social workers convicted of
felonies); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 112-13 (2006) (noting
that a criminal record can result in legal restrictions on employment options).
123. Travis, supra note 119, at 24; see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-195(j) (1999) (requiring
the revocation of the driver's license of anyone convicted of certain crimes); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 28-3304(A) (2004) (requiring the driver's license of a person convicted of certain offenses
to be revoked).
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society and who do not have a faith in the democratic process to reflect their
interests; such a lack of faith in turn can lead them to lose respect for the law.
Taking away offenders' right to vote would naturally exacerbate such
attitudes, and it is difficult to deny that the state's reinforcement of their
feelings of alienation from the rest of the society and other citizens would
have a detrimental impact on rehabilitative efforts.
124
These types of social exclusionist policies are inconsistent with the
system's demand that offenders set their lives straight after going through the
process of conviction and punishment. 25 Our consideration of the recidivist
premium should take into account the government's role in making recidi-
vism a comparatively appealing option for ex-offenders. But in what way?
If the government is a complicit party in the recidivist's reoffending, the
theoretically consistent thing to do seems to be to impose some kind of a
penalty on the government as a complicit actor contributing to the
reoffending. However, the most effective way of communicating the
government's responsibility in contributing to the reoffending may instead be
to reduce the offender's recidivist premium--even though there is something
theoretically odd about one's criminal culpability being reduced just because
there is another blameworthy subject. The difficult question, of course, is
how all this would be done, and the proposal raises many questions. For the
purposes of this Article, the only propositions that I would like to advance
are that the recidivist premium can be justified on the basis of the relation-
ship offenders enter into with the state; that this relationship places an
obligation not only on the offenders, but also on the state; and that the size of
the recidivist premium should reflect the ways in which each party to that
relationship has failed.
124. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 137-64 (2006).
125. There is a difficult question here that I cannot resolve in this Article, and it is this: How
should we think about the government's responsibility in repeat offenders' reoffending, given that
the institution of punishment itself-and not just government policies that deal with ex-offenders-
has the effect of disrupting people's lives in ways that increase the difficulty of living law-abiding
lives? See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 175, 169-80 (1999) (asserting that "[t]he criminal justice system's
exploitation of inequality" not only causes people to doubt the legitimacy of our society's legal
systems, but also undermines the social cohesion within our communities that encourages law-
abiding behavior); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION (2007) (studying the barriers to employment for offenders); WESTERN,
supra note 122, at 108-67 (discussing the effects of incarceration on offenders' chances of finding
employment and on their family lives). Here we run up against a problem of individual
responsibility in adverse conditions, which is analogous to the social-adversity-defense debate
mentioned above. See DUFF, supra note 54, at 182-84 (suggesting that the lost sense of obligation
to obey the law that results when people feel excluded from or disadvantaged by society helps
explain why those people commit crimes). It seems to me that it is an advantage, not a
disadvantage, of my theory that these kinds of questions must be constantly asked under my
framework.
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V. Conclusion
This Article has argued that the recidivist premium should be thought of
not as punishment for a defiant attitude or a bad character trait, but as pun-
ishment for an omission. The culpable omission that justifies the recidivist
premium is the repeat offender's failure, after conviction, to arrange his life
in a way that ensures a life free of further criminality. Although how indi-
viduals conduct their lives as a general matter is not properly the business of
the state, once offenders are convicted of a crime, they enter into a thick re-
lationship with the state, and that relationship gives rise to an obligation for
the offenders to rearrange their lives in order to steer clear of criminal
wrongdoing. This Article has also argued that obligations between the state
and offenders run in both directions, and that we should recognize the ways
in which the state may be a responsible actor that should share the blame for
recidivists' reoffending. Needless to say, many questions remain on how to
implement a theory like this and which aspects of our current practices would
remain and which would change. 126
In addition, there are two broader normative questions that this Article
has not addressed. First, given appropriate retributivist limitations, is it ever
nevertheless justifiable for the state to "punish" those who are likely to re-
offend beyond the level allowed by the just-deserts constraints? This is a
question that this Article must leave untouched. 
127
Second, can the recidivist premium be based on some idea of forfeiture
or loss of citizenship? There are times when the rhetoric surrounding
habitual-offender statutes sounds like an argument in favor of excluding
certain people from the rest of the society, as opposed to punishing them. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to fully evaluate this argument. I would
only say that in debating the recidivist premium, we must identify the mo-
ment at which the discourse of just deserts turns into an argument based on
the idea of forfeiture. Versions of the just-deserts theory retain the notion of
treating offenders as part of the community. The idea would be that a politi-
cal community imposes rules to live by on the members of the community,
and when a member of the community fails to live up to community
126. Some implementation questions (a few of which were discussed above briefly) are: Should
inferences of offenders' failures to set their lives straight from additional offenses be rebuttable?
Should the size of the recidivist premium decrease if repeat offenders can demonstrate the ways in
which they have attempted to set their lives straight? How should we think about the government's
interference with an ex-offender's rehabilitative efforts as a potential mitigating factor? Should
one's criminal record expire after a certain period of time? Should the amount of time elapsed
between the current offense and previous offenses make a difference? Should the degree of
similarity between one's current offense and past offense make a difference for sentencing
purposes? How should we take into account any pattern in reoffending-such as increasing or
decreasing seriousness of crimes-on every subsequent conviction? Should juvenile records be
included? For a discussion of these and various other issues, see Roberts, supra note 2, at 321-41.
127. For some discussions of this question, see sources cited supra note 18.
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standards, the community condemns the failure.128  Habitual-offender
statutes, however, sometimes seem as if they are ways of taking away
people's citizenship and banishing them outside the community's territory.
There is a difference between giving people what they deserve and stripping
them of their citizenship, and we must always be on the lookout for the mo-
ment at which a person who is a full member of the community, but whose
acts nonetheless call for condemnation, starts being treated as a person who
should not be part of the community at all.
129
128. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 54, at 75 (describing the criminal trial in a liberal political
community as a process through which members of the community confront their violations of the
laws, and are held accountable for those violations, while still remaining full members of the
community).
129. See Duff, supra note 18, at 156-63 (exploring the possible grounds for permanently
excluding an offender from the community).
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